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Veil-piercing is an equitable remedy. This simple insight has been lost over 
time. What started as a means for corporate creditors to reach into the 
personal assets of a shareholder has devolved into a doctrinal black hole. 
Courts apply an expansive list of amorphous factors, attenuated from the 
underlying harm, that engenders under-inclusive, unprincipled, and 
unpredictable results for entrepreneurs, litigants, and scholars alike. 
Veil-piercing is misapplied because it is misconceived. The orthodox 
approach is to view veil-piercing as an exception to limited liability that is 
justified potentially only when the latter is not, a path that invariably leads to 
examining scenarios based on different types of creditors/claims, corporations, 
and shareholders. But the occasion to seek derivative relief from a shareholder 
arises only when a claim cannot be enforced against a defendant corporation. 
Veil-piercing is thus a secondary remedy, detached from limited liability and 
its rationales. 
To fix veil-piercing, corporate law must look beyond itself. For centuries the 
law of restitution has featured the constructive trust, an equitable remedy that 
disgorges misappropriated assets from unjustifiably enriched parties. This 
Article novelly re-conceives veil-piercing as constructive trust and 
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demonstrates how its application to judgment-proof corporations can yield 
more coherent and effective results. 
INTRODUCTION 
Veil-piercing is an equitable remedy. This simple insight has been lost over 
time. Since the dawn of modern civilization, corporations have been able to 
enshroud themselves in a “veil” of limited liability.1 And by the early 
nineteenth century, courts began to “pierce” this veil to reach into the personal 
assets of a shareholder.2 Today, veil-piercing has become one of the most 
litigated issues within corporate law,3 permeating the entire business 
landscape, from ordinary transactions to environmental disasters.4 
But from its inception, veil-piercing has been an abysmal failure. There is 
no uniform test for veil-piercing, which typically requires demonstrating that a 
corporation was an “alter ego” or “instrumentality,” controlled or dominated 
by a shareholder to perpetuate a fraud, wrong, or injustice that proximately 
caused loss or injury to a plaintiff.5 To apply this complex test, courts have 
compiled an expansive list of ex post fact-specific factors, none of which is 
dispositive, weighted, or necessarily related to the underlying harm.6 
And then there are the metaphors. Despite Justice Cardozo’s venerable 
caution that “[m]etaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as 
devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it,”7 veil-piercing has 
 
1 Incarnations of limited liability can be found in early Byzantine, Islamic, and Roman 
law. See, e.g., Timothy P. Glynn, Beyond “Unlimiting” Shareholder Liability: Vicarious 
Tort Liability for Corporate Officers, 57 VAND. L. REV. 329, 336 & nn.20-22, 337 & nn.23-
24 (2004) (delineating origins and citing sources). 
2 In the United States, the “cradle” of veil-piercing, KAREN VANDEKERCKHOVE, PIERCING 
THE CORPORATE VEIL 76 (2007), vestiges of the practice can be traced back to 1809, see 
Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 75 (1809) (“[I]t is said that you may 
raise the veil which the corporate name interposes and see who stand behind it.”); Fairfield 
Cnty. Tpk. Co. v. Thorp, 13 Conn. 173, 179 (1839) (“There are cases . . . in which courts 
have drawn aside the veil and looked at the character of the individual corporators . . . .”). 
3 Peter B. Oh, Veil-Piercing, 89 TEX. L. REV. 81, 90 n.59 (2010). 
4 See, e.g., FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW § 1.5, at 69 (2d ed. 2010) 
(describing veil-piercing as “the area of corporation law which the attorney seeking to avoid 
corporate practice is most likely to confront”); see also United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 
51, 61-64 (1998) (fashioning a variant of veil-piercing for claims brought under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 
(CERCLA)). 
5 FREDERICK J. POWELL, PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS: LIABILITY OF A 
PARENT CORPORATION FOR THE OBLIGATIONS OF ITS SUBSIDIARY § 3, at 4-6 (1931). 
6 See, e.g., Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 806, 813-15 
(Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (listing twenty factors); Cathy S. Krendl & James R. Krendl, Piercing 
the Corporate Veil: Focusing the Inquiry, 55 DENVER L.J. 1, 52-55 (1978) (listing thirty-one 
factors). 
7 Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926). 
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enabled judges to unleash their inner poet. The imagery of a corporate “alter 
ego” or “instrumentality” has proven too seductive for courts to resist engaging 
in “jurisprudence by metaphor or epithet,”8 liberally conjuring up a mish-mash 
of gilded allusions.9 
All of this has exacted a steep price from entrepreneurs and litigants. 
Somehow they must navigate their way through an “incoherent”10 and 
“intellectually disturbing”11 doctrine that more closely resembles a tolerated 
evil than a preferred good. The task of justifying veil-piercing has been 
described as “an exercise in futility: an attempt to articulate doctrinal standards 
for an area all too often characterized by ambiguity, unpredictability, and even 
a seeming degree of randomness.”12 Not surprisingly, this has prompted calls 
to discard the doctrine altogether.13 
Veil-piercing is misapplied because it is misconceived. For about a century, 
veil-piercing has been regarded as an exception to, and thus “inextricably 
linked with[,] the predicate principle of limited liability. Hence, what one 
makes of veil piercing depends in the first instance on one’s view of limited 
liability.”14 Pursuant to this view, veil-piercing is justified potentially only 
when limited liability is not. 
This stems from limited liability being framed as loss-allocation.15 The 
orthodox approach defines the scope of shareholder liability according to its 
distributive impact on different types of creditors/claims, corporations, and 
shareholders.16 And nowhere is the approach more apparent than within 
empirical studies of veil-piercing. Published two decades ago, the seminal 
 
8 PHILLIP L. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS IN 
THE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS 8 (1983). 
9 See, e.g., HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 146, at 
344 n.2 (3d ed. 1983) (listing some of the “verbal characterizations, epithets, and 
metaphors” in which “judicial opinions indulge”); see also People v. Clauson, 41 Cal. Rptr. 
691, 694 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (“If the corporation . . . has been acting as a juristic monkey 
to help pull the stockholder[’]s income-chestnuts out of the [income-tax-law-]fire then the 
court will deal with the stockholder-cat as though it was the corporation-monkey’s paw.” 
(quoting Albert Lévitt, Disregarding the Corporate Entity in Tax Cases, 22 TAXES 457, 458 
(1944))); cf. THIS IS SPINAL TAP (Spinal Tap Prod. 1984) (“The musical growth of this band 
cannot even be charted. They are treading water in a sea of retarded sexuality and bad 
poetry.” (quote from character Marty diBergi, played by Rob Reiner)).  
10 David Millon, Piercing the Corporate Veil, Financial Responsibility, and the Limits of 
Liability, 56 EMORY L.J. 1305, 1381 (2007). 
11 ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 38 (1986). 
12 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479, 507 (2001). 
13 Id. at 535; Douglas C. Michael, To Know a Veil, 26 J. CORP. L. 41, 42 (2001). 
14 Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 481; see also infra Part I. 
15 See infra Part I.B. 
16 See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 487 fig.1; Michael, supra note 13, at 46 (“[I]t 
was recognized that veil-piercing cases could be productively analyzed if divided by the 
type of case or plaintiff.”). 
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study is designed entirely from loss-allocation analysis,17 and that path has 
been followed by all subsequent empirical veil-piercing studies.18 
But this is a path to hell,19 dependent upon mistaken assumptions.20 The 
orthodox approach posits a mutually exclusive choice between limited or 
 
17 Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1036, 1044 (1991) (examining approximately 1600 veil-piercing cases according to 
whether they arose from contract, criminal, statutory, or tort claims; involved close or public 
corporations; and targeted corporate or individual shareholders); see also infra notes 98-106 
and accompanying text. 
18 See Christina L. Boyd & David A. Hoffman, Disputing Limited Liability, 104 NW. U. 
L. REV. 853, 877 (2010) (examining 690 federal district court cases from 2000 to 2005); 
Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Bankruptcy Veil-Piercing: Bypassing Broken Nodes?, 27 
EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 471, 473-75 (2010) (extrapolating from West Key Number searches 
of 244,258 contract and/or tort cases from 1947 to 2010); Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, 
Contract-Centered Veil Piercing, 13 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 121, 129 (2007) (extrapolating 
from West Key Number searches of 175,316 contract and/or tort cases from 1947 to 2003); 
Lee C. Hodge & Andrew B. Sachs, Empirical Study, Piercing the Mist: Bringing the 
Thompson Study into the 1990s, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341, 347 (2008) (sampling 228 
cases from 1986 to 1995); John H. Matheson, The Modern Law of Corporate Groups: An 
Empirical Study of Piercing the Corporate Veil in the Parent-Subsidiary Context, 87 N.C. L. 
REV. 1091, 1108 n.5, 1110 (2009) (examining 360 parent-subsidiary cases from January 1, 
1990 to March 1, 2008); Richmond McPherson & Nader Raja, Empirical Study, Corporate 
Justice: An Empirical Study of Piercing Rates and Factors Courts Consider When Piercing 
the Corporate Veil, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 931, 940 (2009) (sampling 236 cases from 
1996 to 2005); Geoffrey C. Rapp, Preserving LLC Veil Piercing: A Response to Bainbridge, 
31 J. CORP. L. 1063, 1068, 1071-72 (2006) (examining sixty-one limited liability company 
rulings from 1997 to 2005); see also Charles Mitchell, Lifting the Corporate Veil in the 
English Courts: An Empirical Study, 3 COMPANY FIN. & INSOLVENCY L. REV. 15, 20-24, 
app. at 24-28 (1999) (examining 290 British cases from 1859 up to and including 1998); Ian 
Ramsay & David B. Noakes, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Australia, 19 COMPANY & SEC. 
L.J. 250, 261 (2001) (examining 104 Australian cases up to and including 1999); Peter B. 
Oh, Piercing v. Lifting 9, 14 (Nov. 17, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) 
(examining 188 British cases from 1888 up to and including 2006). There have been, 
however, some minor refinements to Thompson’s loss-allocation approach. See, e.g., Boyd 
& Hoffman, supra, at 886-901 (parsing various substantive claims and reorganizing data by 
type of creditor). 
19 Cf. PERCY BYSSHE SHELLEY, PROMETHEUS UNBOUND 37 (Lawrence John Zillman ed., 
Yale University Press 1968) (1820) (reinterpreting in poetic form the classic play by 
Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound, about the banishment and then liberation of Prometheus, 
whom Shelley envisioned to resemble Satan, in that he “leads us to weigh his faults with his 
wrongs, and to excuse the former because the latter exceed all measure,” but whom Shelley 
also thought distinctly represented “the type of the highest perfection of moral and 
intellectual nature, impelled by the purest and the truest motives to the best and noblest 
ends”). 
20 Cf. Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 332, 332 
(1985) (“A path-dependent sequence of economic changes is one of which important 
influences upon the eventual outcome can be exerted by temporally remote events, 
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unlimited liability, in which veil-piercing serves to correct misallocated loss.21 
On one level the choice is false because limited liability continues to be upheld 
even in scenarios where it is broadly recognized to be unjustified.22 From a 
positive and normative standpoint, there is thus no basis to presume that 
efficiency-based rationales for limited liability necessarily govern veil-
piercing. On another level the choice is incomplete because analysis of limited 
liability is preoccupied with the law of obligations, that is, claims by contract 
and tort creditors.23 From an empirical and theoretical standpoint, the current 
framework does not or cannot account for, respectively, property and unjust 
enrichment, the remaining two pillars of private law.24 
These problems reflect a deeply flawed conception of veil-piercing. For if 
the analysis for limited liability is so clear and compelling, why is unlimited 
liability analysis such a convoluted inquiry? To date, no one has supplied a 
satisfactory answer.25 The reason may be that everyone apparently has 
forgotten that veil-piercing originated as an equitable procedure to remedy the 
problem of unenforceable judgments. The earliest forms of shareholder 
liability were envisioned as incidental provisional relief, available only when 
none could be had from a corporation.26 Accordingly, whether an initial claim 
lay in contract, property, tort, or unjust enrichment against a corporation had 
no ultimate bearing on whether liability should be imposed on a shareholder. 
Veil-piercing thus was detached from the question of corporate liability. 
In this light the shambled state of veil-piercing is hardly a surprise. Over the 
years there have been incessant attempts to rehabilitate veil-piercing. Some 
have argued for codifying the common law test in the hope that legislative 
guidance and statutory interpretation might constrain courts.27 Others instead 
 
including happenings dominated by chance elements rather than systematic forces.”); O.W. 
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 472-73 (1897). 
21 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the 
Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 109 (1985) (“The [veil-piercing] cases may be 
understood, at least roughly, as attempts to balance the benefits of limited liability against its 
costs.”); see also infra notes 53-60 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra Part I.A. 
23 Cf. RUDOLPH SOHM, THE INSTITUTES: A TEXTBOOK OF THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF 
ROMAN PRIVATE LAW § 77, at 371 (James Crawford Ledlie trans., Oxford at the Clarendon 
Press 3d ed. 1907) (“An obligation arises either from a declaration of consensus, i.e. ex 
contractu, or from an act done in contravention of the law, i.e. ex delicto.”); id. 
(acknowledging that the category does not comprise even the entire universe of possible 
obligatory-esque claims, including “obligationes quasi ex contractu” and “obligationes quasi 
ex delicto” (internal quotation marks omitted)); infra Part I.B. 
24 See, e.g., JAMES GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW: PROPERTY, TORT, 
CONTRACT, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 3 (2006); see also infra notes 121-130 and accompanying 
text. 
25 Cf. infra note 183. 
26 See infra Part I. 
27 See, e.g., Rebecca J. Huss, Revamping Veil Piercing for All Limited Liability Entities: 
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have focused on simplifying the test, proposing ways to distill the universe of 
existing factors into their essential ingredients.28 But all of these approaches 
are premised on loss-allocation analysis. Until this conceptual path linking 
veil-piercing and limited liability can be extirpated, the prospect of a cogent 
remedy will remain illusory. 
To fix veil-piercing, corporate law must look beyond itself. And to find the 
solution, one need look no further than Justice Cardozo, who regarded 
conventional veil-piercing with such eloquent contempt.29 Years before 
dallying with veil-piercing, Cardozo had coronated the constructive trust as 
“the formula through which the conscience of equity finds expression.”30 For 
centuries the law of restitution has provided courts with this means to enforce 
 
Forcing the Common Law Doctrine into the Statutory Age, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 95, 96 
(2001); John H. Matheson & Raymond B. Eby, The Doctrine of Piercing the Veil in an Era 
of Multiple Limited Liability Entities: An Opportunity to Codify the Test for Waiving 
Owners’ Limited-Liability Protection, 75 WASH. L. REV. 147, 152 (2000). But see, e.g., I. 
MAURICE WORMSER, DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE FICTION AND ALLIED CORPORATION 
PROBLEMS 37-38 (1927) (dismissing this idea as “not only impossible but preposterous”). 
Nevertheless, there have been some legislative attempts to control veil-piercing. See, e.g., 
Oh, supra note 3, at 121-23 (analyzing the effects of numerous revisions to article 2.21A of 
the Texas Business Corporation Act, which imposes an actual fraud requirement on veil-
piercing claims grounded in contract). 
28 See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 535 (advocating a test partially derived from 
the factors of fraud and siphoning of funds, on the basis that “these tests are workable”); see 
also infra Part III.A-B. 
29 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. Cardozo’s eloquence ironically obscured, if 
not undermined, his own attempt to fix veil-piercing. See Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 
N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926) (“The logical consistency of a juridical conception will be indeed 
sacrificed at times, when . . . essential to the end some accepted public policy may be 
defended or upheld.”); STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL § 1:4, at 1-24, 
1-21 (2004) (“Shrouding his own analysis irretrievably in the mists of metaphor,” Cardozo’s 
“ringing phrases, when analyzed, yield little of substance.”). Cardozo’s proposed test 
essentially relies on basic agency principles, supplemented with public policy, to thwart a 
perceived “perversion” of limited liability as a state-conferred privilege; premised on this 
now-defunct concession theory, the test has suffered the same fate. See, e.g., Bainbridge, 
supra note 12, at 495 (“It has been over half-a-century since corporate legal theory, of any 
political or economic stripe, took the concession theory seriously.”); Michael, supra note 13, 
at 57 (“It makes no logical sense to base veil-piercing in a theory of corporate privilege.”). 
30 Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 122 N.E. 378, 380 (N.Y. 1919); see also 
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 548 (N.Y. 1928) (“A constructive trust is . . . the 
remedial device through which preference of self is made subordinate to loyalty to others.”). 
Indeed, the new Restatement of Restitution is modeled upon Cardozo’s conception of the 
constructive trust. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55(1) 
cmt. a (2011) (“The remedy described by § 55 is intended to be the same, in scope and in 
function, as the remedy described by Cardozo.”). 
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judgments by disgorging misappropriated assets from the hands of 
unjustifiably enriched parties.31 
At first blush the match seems perfect to even the most jaded skeptic. Never 
have two remedies been so misunderstood. Like veil-piercing, the constructive 
trust has been denigrated as a troubled child of equity.32 Moreover, the 
constructive trust has been banished from the family of ordinary trusts,33 
forced to reside within the shadowy world of quasi-law.34 And, to make 
matters even worse, the constructive trust involves elements of unjust 
enrichment, the shifty relative everyone knows but prefers to avoid.35 
But in truth the constructive trust is what veil-piercing should be. Over time, 
veil-piercing has been stripped of its equitable nature and remedial structure.36 
These attributes, however, pristinely remain with the constructive trust, which 
can supply alternative relief to an inferior, initial remedy in either equity or 
 
31 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55(1) (“If a 
defendant is unjustly enriched by the acquisition of title to identifiable property at the 
expense of the claimant or in violation of the claimant’s rights, the defendant may be 
declared a constructive trustee . . . of the property in question and its traceable product.”); 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION: QUASI-CONTRACTS AND CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS § 
160 (1937) (“Where a person holding title to property is subject to an equitable duty to 
convey it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted 
to retain it, a constructive trust arises.”); infra note 142. 
32 Cf. infra notes 143-149 and accompanying text. 
33 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION: QUASI-CONTRACTS AND 
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS § 160 cmt. a (“Constructive trusts are not dealt with in the 
Restatement of Trusts . . . .”); 5 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, 
THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 461, at 300-02 (4th ed. 2006) (examining why constructive trusts are 
covered by the Restatement (First) of Restitution). 
34 Other condemned cohabitants of this world include quasi-contracts and quasi-torts. See 
infra note 147. But cf. PETER BIRKS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 30 
(1985) (“The common law has found no use for quasi-tort.”). Birks notes “‘[q]uasi-’ and 
‘constructive’ have the same sense,” which is aptly captured by one of his “sillier Oxford 
stories”: 
The college’s rules forbid the keeping of dogs. The Dean keeps a dog. Reflecting on 
the action to be taken, the governing body of the college decides that the labrador is a 
cat and moves to next business. That dog is a constructive cat. Deemed, quasi- or 
fictitious, it is not what it seems. When the law behaves like this you know it is in 
trouble, its intellect either genuinely defeated or deliberately indulging in some 
benevolent dishonesty. . . . If cuckoos had to be quasi-thrushes or constructive 
blackbirds we should know less about them. 
Id. at 22. 
35 The shiftiness can be attributed partially to the status of restitution, which is often 
interchanged with unjust enrichment, as a substantive claim and a remedy. See, e.g., 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. e (“A liability in 
unjust enrichment (restitution) is enforced by restitution’s characteristic remedies . . . and a 
claim in unjust enrichment (restitution) is subject to characteristic defenses.”). 
36 See infra Part I. 
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law.37 Accordingly, the constructive trust’s principles and rationales operate 
independently of whatever kind of creditor/claim, corporation, or shareholder 
is within the original suit. 
And the constructive trust is not just lipstick on the veiled pig. Unlike loss-
allocation, the constructive trust concerns the location of benefit, namely 
whether retention of a misappropriated asset is justified.38 Further, unlike veil-
piercing, this inquiry is not restricted to a shareholder, but instead follows and 
traces a disputed asset to its ultimate holder.39 Moreover, once that holder has 
been designated a constructive trustee, the plaintiff is conferred proprietary 
rights to the asset.40 And when the constructive trustee is insolvent, these rights 
take priority over any general unsecured creditors;41 indeed, although not a 
necessary condition, bankruptcy is the context where the constructive trust 
excels. 
This Article novelly re-conceives veil-piercing as constructive trust. Part I 
evinces how the orthodox approach to veil-piercing as an exception to limited 
liability has no positive or normative merit, either empirically or theoretically. 
Part II proceeds to introduce the constructive trust and demonstrate its 
superiority over prominent alternatives. Part III concludes by showing how the 
constructive trust can be applied to a triad of classic veil-piercing scenarios in a 
more principled manner and with more effective outcomes than the current 
approach. 
I. LIBERATING PIERCING FROM THE VEIL 
Limited liability has been romanticized to mythical proportions. Capping the 
personal risk of shareholders has been hailed as “the greatest single discovery 
of modern times”42 and “one of the first principles of American law.”43 These 
lofty accolades are bolstered by rationales so compelling that they have framed 
 
37 See infra Part II.A. 
38 See infra notes 145-46, 159 and accompanying text. 
39 See infra notes 165-67 and accompanying text. 
40 See infra notes 189-92 and accompanying text. 
41 See infra notes 193-96 and accompanying text. 
42 NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER, WHY SHOULD WE CHANGE OUR FORM OF GOVERNMENT? 
82 (1912) (“Even steam and electricity are far less important than the limited liability 
corporation, and they would be reduced to comparative unimportance without it.”); see also 
WORMSER, supra note 27, at 14 (“[M]any immigrants doubtless possess full knowledge of 
th[e] fact [that limited liability is the greatest advantage of incorporation] before coming 
within hailing distance of the Statue of Liberty.”). 
43 PRESSER, supra note 29, § 1.1, at 1-4 to -5 (“It is now accepted as one of the first 
principles of American law that those who own shares in corporations . . . normally are not 
liable for the debts of their corporations.”); see also William W. Cook, “Watered Stock” – 
Commissions – “Blue Sky Laws” – Stock Without Par Value, 19 MICH. L. REV. 583, 583 n.4 
(1921) (quoting President of Harvard University Charles William Eliot: “[T]he privilege of 
limited liability [is] the corporation’s most precious characteristic. [And it] is by far the 
most effective legal invention for business purposes made in the nineteenth century . . . .”). 
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and governed limited liability’s primary exception, veil-piercing. The question 
of when a shareholder should be held liable personally for corporate debts is 
answered by determining when limited liability is not justified. This invariably 
leads to analysis of various scenarios, based on different types of 
creditors/claims, corporations, and shareholders. 
This Part shows how this path has been paved with mistaken notions. The 
first Section evinces the illogic of conceiving limited liability in exclusive 
terms with veil-piercing qua unlimited liability. The second Section then 
exposes the illegitimacy of analyzing veil-piercing in connection with different 
types of creditors/claims or corporations. After this conception and analysis are 
shown to be dead ends that must be abandoned, piercing is left standing alone 
as a post-judgment equitable remedy, independent of the veil of limited 
liability and its rationales. 
A. Delimiting Liability 
The rationales for limited liability have mutated over time. Prior to 1809, 
when the first general incorporation statute was enacted, unlimited liability 
apparently was the initial default rule.44 But the advent of the War of 1812 
provided a patriotic reason for states to limit the liability of shareholders as a 
means of making the corporate form accessible to entrepreneurs of all kinds 
and means.45 Roughly a century later, with the shift from a concessionary to 
contractarian paradigm for conceiving the firm, the justifications for limited 
liability correspondingly embraced a modern preference for economic 
efficiency.46 Today, those principles unquestionably govern not only limited 
liability, but its chief exception, veil-piercing. 
One justification for limited liability is enhanced firm governance. The 
characteristic separation between corporate ownership and control inherently 
generates agency costs.47 Managers have an incentive to minimize these costs 
 
44 See Act of Mar. 3, 1809, ch. 65, § 6, 1809 Mass. Acts 464, 466; Oscar Handlin & 
Mary F. Handlin, Origins of the American Business Corporation, 5 J. ECON. HIST. 1, 10 
(1945) (“Examination of contemporary Anglo-American law . . . strikes at the very roots of 
the common assumption that limited liability was always an essential attribute of 
corporateness . . . .”); Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of 
Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 208 (1985) (“[T]ruly limited shareholder liability 
was far from the norm in America even as late as 1900.”). 
45 PRESSER, supra note 29, § 1:3, at 1-14 to -15 (arguing that limited liability served “as a 
means of encouraging the small-scale entrepreneur, and of keeping entry into business 
markets competitive and democratic. Without [limited liability], it was believed, only the 
very wealthiest men . . . could possess the privilege of investing in corporations.” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
46 See id. at 1-16 (“[W]hether or not the democratic justification has since been lost sight 
of, the economic argument of the public’s potential gains from a policy of limited liability . . 
. has remained the primary justification for limited liability.”); Larry E. Ribstein, Limited 
Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L. REV. 80, 83-84, 130 (1991). 
47 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
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because unrestricted transferability provides dissatisfied shareholders with an 
option for disinvestment.48 Limited liability not only promotes such 
transferability, but also permits managers to pursue more profitable projects 
due to the capped risk for shareholders.49 As a result, investors can assume a 
passive role with respect to monitoring the firm and their fellow shareholders’ 
solvency.50 
Another justification for limited liability is more facile shareholding. With 
the amount of risk restricted to the purchase price, shares can be a fungible and 
normalized reflection of different firms’ value.51 And by stabilizing the extent 
of total liability, investors can reduce risk even further by diversifying their 
stock portfolios.52 In this way limited liability stimulates broad participation 
within capital markets. 
These well-established economic rationales all share a basic premise. As 
Stephen Presser has noted, “[t]he principal thrust of law and economics 
analysis of limited liability has been to demonstrate that the rule is more 
efficient than a rule of unlimited liability.”53 In contractarian terms the issue 
assumes the form of a hypothetical ex ante bargaining session that asks: “If the 
shareholders and creditors could costlessly bargain . . . would they adopt a rule 
of limited or unlimited personal liability?”54 The choice seems quite natural, 
 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976). 
48 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 21, at 94-95 (“The costs of the separation of 
investment and management (agency costs) may be substantial. . . . Investors individually 
respond to excessive agency costs by disinvesting.”). 
49 Id. at 97 (“[M]anagers maximize investors’ welfare by investing in any project with a 
positive net present value. They can accept high-variance ventures . . . without exposing the 
investors to ruin.”). Some might prefer to say “externalized” rather than “capped” risk. Nina 
A. Mendelson, A Control-Based Approach to Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 
102 COLUM. L. REV. 1203, 1206, 1239 (2002) (“[T]he presence of a controlling shareholder 
likely will prompt a corporation to externalize more costs than if the corporation’s equity is 
diffusely held by many very small shareholders.”). But see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra 
note 21, at 98 (“Limited liability is an arrangement under which the loss largely lies where it 
falls. Loss is swallowed rather than shifted.”). 
50 See David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1565, 1570-74 (1991). 
51 See Paul Halpern et al., An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation 
Law, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 117, 129-31 (1980). 
52 Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 
259, 262 (1967) (“One of the great advantages of the large corporate system is that it allows 
individuals to use small fractions of their savings for various purposes, without risking a 
disastrous loss if any corporation in which they have invested becomes insolvent.”). 
53 PRESSER, supra note 29, § 1:7, at 1-35 (emphasis added). 
54 Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 486-87; see also Richard A. Posner, The Rights of 
Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 499, 522 (1976) (suggesting that 
one test for disregarding limited liability due to corporate misrepresentation “would be to 
differentiate among types of creditors in terms of their information costs”). Stephen Presser 
asserts that Posner “is simply developing an argument, the inappropriateness of piercing the 
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given the historical prominence of unlimited liability,55 as well as its default 
status in the event of defective incorporation.56 Along these lines, the merits of 
any prospective increase in shareholder liability are to be measured against the 
costs of sacrificing limited liability.57 
Indeed, this premise girds the relation between limited liability and veil-
piercing. Because the latter results in joint and several liability for 
shareholders, its net effect mimics pure unlimited liability.58 Accordingly, the 
orthodox approach is to conceptualize veil-piercing qua unlimited liability as a 
contiguous exception to limited liability. 
 






Figure 1 simply depicts the conventional view that, “[o]nce the appropriate 
limits of limited liability are understood, veil piercing can police those limits. 
That understanding, however, depends on a sound sense of the policy basis for 
limited liability . . . .”59 Indeed, some have even argued that the difficulties 
with veil-piercing are the product of “a failure to identify what is at stake in a 
veil piercing case: the very principle of limited liability for the shareholders.”60 
 
veil in a contractual context, already advanced by [Frederick] Powell.” PRESSER, supra note 
29, § 1:7, at 1-38.   
55 See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. 
56 Fred S. McChesney, Doctrinal Analysis and Statistical Modeling in Law: The Case of 
Defective Incorporation, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 493, 496-97 (1993) (characterizing defective 
incorporation as a subset of veil-piercing).  But see Timothy R. Wyatt, Note, The Doctrine 
of Defective Incorporation and Its Tenuous Coexistence with the Model Business 
Corporation Act, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 833, 847-51 (2009) (criticizing McChesney’s 
assertion). 
57 There are, however, alternatives to limited liability. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, 
supra note 21, at 101-03 (assessing the possibility of investor insurance purchased by the 
firm). 
58 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for 
Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1932 (1991) (“[V]eil-piercing is itself simply a form 
of unlimited liability.”). But cf., e.g., Leebron, supra note 50, at 1578-79 (“Liability in 
excess of a corporation’s assets might be assessed against shareholders either on a joint and 
several or on a pro rata basis. . . . However, any joint liability rule probably would be 
coupled with a contribution rule. . . . [Joint liability coupled with contribution, in some 
aspects, would be] equivalent to a pro rata rule . . . .” (footnote omitted)).  
59 Millon, supra note 10, at 1311; see also supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
60 Jonathan M. Landers, A Unified Approach to Parent, Subsidiary, and Affiliate 
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The principle, however, has its own limitations. A common distinction for 
limited liability concerns its justifications for close versus public 
corporations.61 Unlike their close peers, shareholders of public corporations 
tend to be passive investors that enjoy the benefit of unrestricted 
transferability.62 Accordingly, the corporate governance justifications for 
limited liability would seem to be stronger in the publicly held context.63 
And yet public corporations do present a moral-hazard problem.64 Limited 
liability gives managers an incentive to pursue overly risky projects that inure 
to shareholders.65 Further, moral hazard tends to be even more pervasive when 
there are affiliates or subsidiaries,66 a common setup for public corporations.67 
 
Questions in Bankruptcy, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 589, 620 (1975). 
61 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 21, at 109-10 (“The distinction between close and 
public corporations is supported by economic logic. . . . This has profound implications for 
the role of limited liability.”); Manne, supra note 52, at 278 (“As we begin to examine the 
differences between [these two types of] corporations, it becomes apparent that the two are 
extremely dissimilar.”). 
62 Cf. Manne, supra note 52, at 279 (“Participants in a small business have a very real 
interest in knowing and controlling the identity of other participants. Thus it is not 
surprising to find that restrictions on share transferability are very common with small 
corporations.”). 
63 Millon, supra note 10, at 1314 (“The argument for limited liability may be less 
compelling as to shareholders of close corporations than as to those of publicly held 
companies.”). Certainly, the distinction enjoys considerable empirical support, as every veil-
piercing study has found that plaintiffs prevail exclusively against close corporations. E.g., 
Oh, supra note 3, at 110 tbl.3 (finding a 0.00% veil-piercing rate in four cases involving a 
public corporation); Thompson, supra note 17, at 1055 tbl.7 (finding a 0.00% veil-piercing 
rate in nine cases involving a public corporation); Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Veil 
Within Corporate Groups: Corporate Shareholders as Mere Investors, 13 CONN. J. INT’L L. 
379, 384 (1999) (updating his 1991 study with an additional ten years of cases, and still 
finding that “[p]iercing the veil is a doctrine directed exclusively at close corporations and 
corporate groups”). This finding, however, serves less to vindicate limited liability’s 
rationales, and more to reflect the reality that public corporations tend to feature disperse 
shareholding that in turn precludes a sufficient level of control or domination to justify veil-
piercing. See, e.g., GEVURTZ, supra note 4, § 1.5.3, at 78 (“[R]equiring control screens out 
piercing against the shareholders of a publicly traded corporation . . . . This provides a 
doctrinal underpinning to explain the fact that there never has been a case in which the court 
pierced to hold shareholders in a public corporation liable for the company’s debts.”). 
64 The moral-hazard problem is not restricted to publicly held corporations. On the 
contrary, the problem arguably is more pernicious within the closely held context. Halpern 
et al., supra note 51, at 141 (stating that the moral hazard problem “is likely to be more 
severe for small, tightly held companies than for larger companies”). The point here is 
merely to illustrate that, even within the most compelling scenarios, efficiency-based 
justifications do not determine the complete scope of limited liability. 
65 Id. at 140-41. 
66 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 21, at 111 (“[T]he moral-hazard problem is 
probably greater in parent-subsidiary situations because subsidiaries have less incentive to 
insure.”); Leebron, supra note 50, at 1617, 1619 (“With regard to integrated subsidiaries, 
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Accordingly, there is a broad consensus that limited liability should not apply 
in these situations.68 
This consensus, however, does not rest on efficiency grounds. Under the 
shareholding rationale,69 imposing joint and several liability for mass risk 
would discourage investment, as well as open the door to judgment-proof 
firms.70 And, under the corporate-governance rationale, the loss due to mass 
risk presents no direct concern to shareholders, provided agency costs are 
relatively low.71 On balance, then, limited liability should apply to firms that 
engage in mass-risk activities, even when they have a negative net social 
value.72 The unpalatable nature of this conclusion, even for the staunchest 
 
there is little reason to respect the separate corporate entities when noncontractual tort 
claimants are involved. . . . It is unclear what justifies the legal presumption against veil 
piercing between related corporations on behalf of noncontractual creditors.”). 
67 Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 21 (1996) (“Th[e] parent-
subsidiary ownership strategy is in wide use among the largest companies in America. Most 
large companies consist of numerous corporate entities. Limiting liability – that is, defeating 
part of it – is the principal reason for creating those entities.” (footnote omitted)). 
68 E.g., Mendelson, supra note 49, at 1204 (“There is little disagreement that limited 
shareholder liability for corporate torts can encourage socially costly corporate activity – 
risky activity selected because the corporation and its shareholders do not bear all the 
expected costs of the activity.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 1204 n.2 (citing sources). A 
notable few, however, maintain an agnostic position. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra 
note 21, at 104 (“Externalization of risk imposes social costs and thus is undesirable. The 
implications of this point, however, are unclear, both because modifying limited liability has 
its costs and because moral hazard would exist without limited liability.”). 
69 See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. 
70 See Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 492 (“[I]t would be prohibitively costly for the 
creditor of a corporation to bring individual suits against thousands of geographically 
diverse investors.”); Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 58, at 1903 (“There is no doubt 
that unlimited liability . . . would increase the cost of equity. . . . If shareholders faced joint 
and several liability for all corporate debts . . . these costs might be very large.”). Along with 
numerous other commentators, Hansmann and Kraakman instead provocatively propose a 
regime of pro rata liability. Id. at 1903 & n.69. Not everyone agrees with this proposal, 
however. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 496-500 (criticizing the proposal and citing 
other critical sources). The proper scope and form of limited liability are beyond the 
purview of this paper; the point here is merely that limited liability and its rationales do not 
extend logically to veil-piercing. 
71 See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text. To be sure, shareholders would be 
concerned if mass risk resulted in a diminished share price, but the effect is indirect as such 
liabilities would be diluted and spread over time, during which there would be ample 
opportunity for exit. 
72 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 58, at 1883 (“Since limited liability permits 
cost externalization, a corporation engaged in highly risky activities can have positive value 
for its shareholder, and thus can be an attractive investment, even when its net present value 
to society as a whole is negative.”). A useful parallel is the theory of efficient breach of 
contracts. See Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of 
Efficient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 629, 630, 638 (1988) (“Since so many contract 
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proponents of limited liability,73 belies that limited liability’s “real policy 
basis . . . does not appear to be efficiency. Instead, the goal seems to be to 
promote investment by transferring risk from investors to creditors.”74 This is 
the apparent goal of legislatures, which uniformly embrace broad limited 
liability.75 Consequently, the task of minimizing moral hazard has fallen to 
courts, which have imposed liability on corporate agents in specialized 
scenarios.76 
But this is not veil-piercing. Pure veil-piercing enables a plaintiff to reach 
the personal assets of only a shareholder.77 From a strict efficiency standpoint, 
courts can and should impose liability on a shareholder that induces a 
corporation to generate mass risk with a negative net value. Liability in these 
situations is directed at corporate agents, such as directors and officers, and yet 
still analyzed within the veil-piercing rubric.78 And because the remedy is 
designed for shareholders, courts have had to adapt the multiple factors that 
already bear little, if no, connection with the underlying harm.79 As a result, 
 
remedies depart in one direction or the other from the ‘ideal’ of perfect compensation, the 
prospect of inefficient breaches . . . would seem to loom large.”). 
73 See supra note 49. 
74 Millon, supra note 10, at 1317. 
75 See Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 500 (highlighting that states apparently refuse to 
repeal limited liability “for mass torts, or indeed, torts of any kind” and that “[t]he 
availability of limited liability in related contexts . . . likewise has been reaffirmed”); 
Millon, supra note 10, at 1314 (“Corporate statutes all confer limited liability in general 
terms. . . . There is no distinction between contract- and tort-based claims or between 
closely held or public corporations.”). 
76 See infra note 80. 
77 Helen Anderson, Piercing the Veil on Corporate Groups in Australia: The Case for 
Reform, 33 MELB. U. L. REV. 333, 342 (2009) (“‘Pure’ veil-piercing occurs where liability is 
imposed simply because a legal person occupies the position of a shareholder.”).  
78 Cf. United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 64-67 (1998) (examining vicarious 
liability provisions within CERCLA). With unanimous support Justice Souter acknowledged 
that, “whereas the rules of veil piercing limit derivative liability for the actions of another 
corporation, CERCLA’s ‘operator’ provision is concerned primarily with direct liability for 
one’s own actions.” Id. at 65. The Court, however, ultimately rejected the suggestion from 
courts and commentators that an “indirect, veil-piercing approach can subject a parent 
corporation to liability only as an owner, and not as an operator” under CERCLA. Id. at 64 
n.10. 
79 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. In Bestfoods, for instance, the Court realized 
that the amorphous veil-piercing standards for parent-subsidiary control could not be 
adapted to directors and officers, and instead fashioned an even more nebulous test: 
[T]he presumption that an act is taken on behalf of the corporation for whom the 
officer claims to act is strongest when the act is perfectly consistent with the norms of 
corporate behavior, but wanes as the distance from those accepted norms approaches 
the point of action by a dual officer plainly contrary to the interests of the subsidiary 
yet nonetheless advantageous to the parent. 
Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 70 n.13. Tellingly, though, the Court backed away from its own test, 
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limited liability has spawned a group of cases that look and stumble like veil-
piercing, but in fact are not.80 
This mutation belies how limited liability and veil-piercing are misaligned. 
The rationales for limited liability justify its preservation within a broad range 
of scenarios.81 But that justification does not quadrate perfectly with the scope 
of veil-piercing qua unlimited liability: 
 
Figure 2A. The Mass Risk Scenario82 
 





Figure 2A depicts the mass risk scenario as an area where limited liability 
applies, albeit unjustifiably, while the shaded box represents the gap where 
courts have attempted to stretch veil-piercing beyond its original form with 
distortive results. The problem, however, cannot be ascribed to just a 
misapplication of veil-piercing; somewhat understandably courts have elected 
the path of least resistance by exploiting a malleable common law test for veil-
piercing rather than chipping away at the statutory strictures of limited 
liability. 
Rather, the principal culprit is a mistaken premise that limited liability and 
veil-piercing are mutually exclusive. The moral-hazard problem highlights the 
relevance of broad policy considerations, in addition to efficiency, to 
determining the proper scope of limited liability. In the specific case of mass 
 
stating that it was not an “attempt to recite the ways in which the Government could show 
that dual officers or directors were in fact acting on behalf of the parent.” Id. 
80 See, e.g., Worth v. Tyler, 276 F.3d 249, 262 (7th Cir. 2001) (rejecting application of 
“alter ego” theory for individual liability under Title VII); UA Local 343 of the United 
Ass’n of Journeymen v. Nor-Cal Plumbing, Inc., 48 F.3d 1465, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The 
alter ego doctrine as developed in labor law is analytically different from the traditional veil-
piercing doctrine as developed in corporate law.”); Lumpkin v. Envirodyne Indus., Inc., 933 
F.2d 449, 461 (7th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he corporate veil may be pierced more easily in ERISA 
cases . . . to promote the federal policies underlying the statute . . . .”); Morris Okun, Inc. v. 
Harry Zimmerman, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 346, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (distinguishing statutory 
trust for sellers and suppliers under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act “from the 
piercing the veil doctrine”); Comm’r v. RLG, Inc., 755 N.E.2d 556, 563 (Ind. 2001) (“The 
responsible corporate officer doctrine is distinct from piercing the corporate veil, and 
explicitly expands liability beyond veil-piercing.”). 
81 See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text. 
82 Mass risk is merely one example of the misalignment between limited liability and 
veil-piercing. Another scenario concerns affiliate or sibling entities owned by a common 
shareholder. See infra Part III.C. 
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risk, a choice is posed between stimulating corporate investment and protecting 
social welfare.83 Courts currently misframe the choice in terms of whether to 
impose personal liability on corporate agents.84 But even if the inquiry were 
focused properly on shareholders, the competing policies implicated by mass 
risk have no bearing on whether veil-piercing will occur. Instead a myriad of 
independent and unweighted factors determine whether a judgment against a 
corporation will be satisfied by resort to personal assets.85 The application and 
scope of veil-piercing thus are detached from the dynamics of the moral hazard 
problem, which accounts for the unpredictable and unprincipled doctrinal state 
of affairs. 
Instead, shareholder liability should be conceived as a balancing test. On the 
one hand, whether liability should be applied on a limited or unlimited basis is 
an ex ante inquiry, which turns on efficiency and policy considerations.86 On 
the other hand, whether creditors should be awarded relief from a 
shareholder’s (or agent’s) personal assets is an ex post inquiry, which involves 
traditional veil-piercing or some other kind of remedy.87 These inquiries, 
therefore, should be de-linked: 
 
Figure 2B. The Mass Risk Scenario Redux 
 
EX ANTE EX POST 
Limited 





To be sure, a regime of unlimited liability has the same ultimate effect as 
veil-piercing, in that a shareholder is personally responsible for corporate 
debts;88 conversely, for that shareholder, veil-piercing does entail displacing 
 
83 See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text. 
84 See supra note 76 and accompanying text; cf. Leebron, supra note 50, at 1587 (“Even 
assuming that shareholders who would be held liable will cause managers to act efficiently 
in taking potential losses into account . . . there may be costs to unlimited liability that 
outweigh its benefits.”). 
85 See supra note 6. 
86 See supra notes 50-57, 69-75 and accompanying text. 
87 Kevin M. Warsh, Corporate Spinoffs and Mass Tort Liability, 1995 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 675, 696 (describing “what Professor [Reinier] Kraakman calls ‘ex post remedies,’ a 
series of legal doctrines that further protect contract creditors from the management and 
equityholders: veil-piercing, fraudulent conveyance law and equitable subordination”); see 
also infra Part II.B. 
88 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
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limited liability. But the present approach to veil-piercing does not take into 
account whether limited liability is justified. And there is no necessary logical 
relationship between the propriety of protecting the corporate form and 
awarding a remedy such as veil-piercing.89 
B. Disclaiming Piercing 
The conceptual shadow cast by limited liability has stunted veil-piercing in 
another crucial way. Pursuant to the conventional view, the scope of veil-
piercing can be defined simply by determining the scenarios where limited 
liability is justified. To organize these scenarios, scholars began to classify 
veil-piercing cases based on different types of substantive claims. What was 
once a scheme borne largely from convenience, however, has become an 
integral, but deficient, feature of veil-piercing analysis. 
The approach originated with William Douglas and Carrol Shanks.90 Their 
early analysis of parent-subsidiary cases framed shareholder liability in terms 
of loss-allocation: “The issue is whether the loss resulting from a contract or 
tort claim against the subsidiary will be placed on it or the parent. . . . For 
analytical reasons the cases will be grouped according to whether the claim is 
tort or contract.”91 Those analytical reasons subsequently were articulated by 
Elvin Latty, who observed that parent-subsidiary liability cases 
present narrower issues, to be solved by principles . . . [that] follow[] 
more or less beaten paths in fields of law often quite remote from that of 
stockholder liability. . . . Many of the cases that purport to be, or are cited 
as being, decided upon a broad ground of stockholder’s liability really 
involve the stockholder’s own torts or contracts.92 
 
89 This can be gleaned by the uncertainty over whether veil-piercing should be available 
against unincorporated business entities. See Larry E. Ribstein, Reverse Limited Liability 
and the Design of Business Associations, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 199, 216-19 (2005) (focusing 
on reverse-piercing, but also demonstrating how traditional veil-piercing is ill-equipped for 
asset partitioning within partnerships). 
90 See William O. Douglas & Carrol M. Shanks, Insulation from Liability Through 
Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE L.J. 193, 194 (1929). One commentator has speculated 
that “[t]he trend toward principled analysis probably began with Alexander Hamilton Frey’s 
1951 discussion of defective incorporation.” Michael, supra note 13, at 46 (citing Alexander 
Hamilton Frey, Legal Analysis and the “De Facto” Doctrine, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 1153, 
1153 (1952)). Douglas and Shanks’ work, however, antedates Frey’s, which Michael admits 
is “not directly relevant to the veil-piercing issue.” Id. 
91 Douglas & Shanks, supra note 90, at 194-95 (“The problem here is to ascertain the 
manner of organization and operation which is necessary in order to secure the insulation 
from liability which the organizers desired and which the legal system permits. . . . On 
analysis the problem resolves itself into one of allocation of losses.”). 
92 ELVIN R. LATTY, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS: A STUDY IN 
STOCKHOLDERS’ LIABILITY §§ 22-23, at 77-78 (1936); see also supra note 23. 
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The distinction between contract and tort thus was introduced only to classify 
various shareholder liability cases.93 
Latty had the foresight to recast this distinction in terms of creditors. In his 
view, the boundaries of contract and tort were drawn in ways that failed to 
reflect differences between veil-piercing cases within the parent-subsidiary 
context.94 Decades later, Henry Manne explained that the risk of corporate 
insolvency simply represents a cost of doing business for voluntary creditors, 
who have incentives to insure themselves, unlike involuntary creditors, who 
are victims of unforeseeable harms.95 
However drawn, the distinction continues to serve as a prism for identifying 
scenarios when shareholder liability is justified.96 As one commentator has 
observed, “modern veil-piercing analysis has created at least three types of 
cases,” organized by the plaintiff’s original claim.97 This is most clearly 
manifest within the methodology employed by the legion of empirical veil-
piercing studies. Loss-allocation analysis supplies the blueprint for Robert 
Thompson’s seminal study, which collected data from approximately 1600 
veil-piercing opinions on claims within four substantive areas: contract, 
 
93 Cf. Holmes, supra note 20, at 462 (“If you commit a tort, you are liable to pay a 
compensatory sum. If you commit a contract, you are liable to pay a compensatory sum 
unless the promised event comes to pass, and that is all the difference.”); Roy Kreitner, 
Fault at the Contract-Tort Interface, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1533, 1534-37 (2009) (recounting 
how tort and contract law had “switch[ed] positions” with regard to fault by the late 
nineteen century, which contributed to the realignment of these two respective areas of 
private law “along the border between public regulation and private ordering”). 
94 LATTY, supra note 92, § 49, at 201 (“To make the classification more significant, the 
line of distinction should perhaps be drawn between involuntary and voluntary creditors, 
inasmuch as there may be some doubt as to whether . . . e.g., claimants under a breech [sic] 
of warranty, should be treated like those, say, who lend money to the subsidiary.”). Latty’s 
observation, however, tends to be disregarded in modern analysis. See, e.g., Bainbridge, 
supra note 12, at 487 n.40 (using “the terms ‘contract creditor’ to encompass all classes of 
voluntary creditors and ‘tort creditor’ to encompass all classes of involuntary creditors”); 
Millon, supra note 10, at 1316 (“Involuntary, or tort, creditors are in a quite different 
situation [than voluntary creditors with claims based on obligations arising out of 
contract].”). 
95 See Manne, supra note 52, at 263 (“[A]t least in the case of voluntary creditors – 
which certainly includes most business creditors – the risk of insolvency is regularly 
understood and, where significant, treated as any other cost. . . . This last explanation of 
limited liability does not account for the problem of the involuntary creditor, or . . . 
noncommercial creditors.”); see also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 21, at 107-09 
(arguing that, with respect to involuntary creditors, the incentives for insurance are shifted 
to the corporation). But see Halpern et al., supra note 51, at 147 (“[M]erely because a 
creditor is ‘involuntary’ does not in every case conclude the case against limited liability.”). 
96 The same function is performed by the conventional distinctions between closely and 
publicly held corporations, as well as between individual and corporate shareholders. See 
supra note 63; infra note 224. 
97 Michael, supra note 13, at 54. 
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criminal, statute, and tort.98 And that basic approach has served as the template 
for all subsequent empirical veil-piercing studies.99 
Moreover, despite Thompson’s caution,100 his study ignited a controversy 
about veil-piercing in relation to contract versus tort claims. The prevailing 
view of courts and commentators, regardless of ideological stripe, long has 
been that contract creditors should have less success with veil-piercing because 
of the opportunity to assess and insure themselves from risk.101 Thompson’s 
study, however, found that requests for veil-piercing occur and prevail 
considerably more often when couched in contract than tort,102 a result that he 
acknowledged, “more than any other in the project, go[es] against the 
conventional wisdom.”103 
My re-examination of opinions has restored the wisdom in favor of tort and 
involuntary creditors, but even these results are unsatisfying. Federal and state 
courts inexplicably still pierce in contract and voluntary creditor claims at rates 
far higher than what one might expect, while the margin between these rates 
and, respectively, tort and involuntary-creditor claims hardly reflects the 
disparate strength of these rationales.104 Existing empirical data thus have 
provided only part of the story about veil-piercing litigation.105 
 
98 Thompson, supra note 17, at 1058 tbl.9 (reporting veil-piercing rates for contract, 
criminal, statute, and tort claims); Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Veil: Is the Common 
Law the Problem?, 37 CONN. L. REV. 619, 628 (2005) (“Recognizing a corporation as 
separate from its shareholders is a way of allocating risk in a business transaction.” 
(emphasis omitted)); see also supra note 17 and accompanying text. But cf. Oh, supra note 
3, at 94 nn.77-78 (noting that the approximate total dataset for Thompson’s study matches 
the total number of claims, manifesting a reduction of multiple claims within each opinion 
into one data entry). 
99 See supra note 18. 
100 Thompson, supra note 63, at 392 (“I would discourage devoting too much attention to 
whether corporate law conflicts with tort law . . . .”). 
101 E.g., PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: TORT, CONTRACT, AND 
OTHER COMMON LAW PROBLEMS IN THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY 
CORPORATIONS § 8.04, at 163 (1987) (“[V]ery special pressures in tort require a different 
treatment than [veil-piercing] cases arising in other areas of the law, such as contract.”); 
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 21, at 112 (“Courts are more willing to disregard the 
corporate veil in tort than in contract cases. . . . Contract creditors . . . are compensated ex 
ante for the increased risk of default ex post. Tort creditors, by contrast, are not 
compensated.”); Leebron, supra note 50, at 1601 (“[A]lmost every commentator has paused 
to note that limited liability cannot be satisfactorily justified for tort victims . . . .”). 
102 Thompson, supra note 17, at 1058 tbl.9 (reporting a veil-piercing rate of 41.98% for 
contract versus 30.97% for tort); Thompson, supra note 63, at 385 (reporting that “new data 
suggests that the judiciary is still reluctant to pierce the veil in tort cases”). 
103 Thompson, supra note 17, at 1058; cf. PRESSER, supra note 29, § 1:7, at 1-36 n.5 
(noting that Thompson’s results “appear to be on their way to becoming the conventional 
wisdom”). 
104 See Oh, supra note 3, at 125 tbl.8 (finding a veil-piercing rate of 46.24% for contract 
versus 47.75% for tort); id. at 142 tbl.15 (finding a veil-piercing rate of 47.50% for 
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This may be because all of the studies share a conceptual deficiency. To 
date, no one has classified veil-piercing opinions based on substantive claims 
arising in either property or unjust enrichment.106 And these claims have been 
neglected almost entirely by commentators.107 The neglect is curious, 
particularly in light of the historical conception of shareholder liability as a 
property-based mesne process.108 And the continued use of veil-piercing as an 
equitable remedy should have exposed the incompleteness of an analysis 
confined to contract and tort.109 
The omission is due to our dependence on loss-allocation analysis. The 
initial framing by Douglas and Shanks reflects their contemporary fancy with 
splitting the unitary domain of obligations within Roman Law into contract and 
tort along the lines of fault.110 While the line has been re-drawn by economic 
analysis, the contract-tort divide continues to thrive within agency and, by 
extension, corporate law.111 Pursuant to this orthodox approach, the scope of 
 
voluntary creditors versus 52.83% for involuntary creditors). 
105 Even an attempt to combat selection effects by analyzing veil-piercing dockets yields 
materially similar results. See Boyd & Hoffman, supra note 18, at 886-901. 
106 See supra note 18. Data for these claims are reported, if at all, within the diverse 
category of statutory claims. See Oh, supra note 3, at 129 tbl.10 (reporting twenty-two real 
property and forty-nine remedial veil-piercing cases arising under a statute); see also Boyd 
& Hoffman, supra note 18, at 887 fig.7 (presenting cause-of-action data for “Equitable 
Solutions” and “Property Law,” as distinguished from “Enforcement Mechanisms,” “Other 
State Claims,” “Other Federal Claims,” and “Veil Piercing,” although the basis for that 
distinction is not clear and the categories are not necessarily of comparable scope).  
107 But see Warner Fuller, The Incorporated Individual: A Study of the One-Man 
Company, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1373, 1397 (1938) (describing veil-piercing claims in property 
law); Jason W. Neyers, Canadian Corporate Law, Veil-Piercing, and the Private Law 
Model Corporation, 50 U. TORONTO L.J. 173, 238 (2000) (“[I]f X would have been found 
liable under a general tort, contract, unjust enrichment, or statutory analysis, the court will 
find them liable through some sort of ‘veil-piercing.’”). 
108 See, e.g., Act of Mar. 4, 1800, ch. 80, § 8, 1799 Mass. Acts 481, 484 (“[I]n any 
judgment to be rendered against said Corporation, [a] Plaintiff, not being able to find any 
property of the Corporation to attach on mesne process, or whereon to levy his Execution, 
shall have the right of attaching or levying his Execution on any . . . individual Members of 
the Corporation, in the same manner as if the Action had been brought and the judgment 
rendered against them in their individual capacity.”).  
109 See 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF 
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 41.10, at 136-37 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2006) (“A claim based on 
the alter ego theory is not in itself a claim for substantive relief, but rather is procedural. . . . 
It has been said that the alter ego doctrine is thus remedial, not defensive, in nature.”). 
110 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. The influence of obligations on loss-
allocation analysis might explain why Thompson’s empirical study of veil-piercing did not 
recognize fraud as a separate substantive claim. See Oh, supra note 3, at 95-97. 
111 See Caroline Bradley, Transatlantic Misunderstandings: Corporate Law and 
Societies, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 269, 279 (1999) (“[M]uch of corporate law is an adaptation 
of the rules of tort, contract, and agency to fit a special legal form . . . .”); Eric Rasmusen, 
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veil-piercing turns on a choice of whether shareholder liability should be 
limited or unlimited,112 which then migrates into an analysis of different types 
of creditors/claims. 
Contributing to this migration is concern over the mass-risk scenario. Even 
when analyzed by Ronald Coase,113 the prospect of third parties bearing risk 
from corporate torts was more hypothetical than real. That started to change 
two decades ago, setting the stage for Henry Hansmann and Reinier 
Kraakman’s provocative proposal of a pro rata shareholder liability regime for 
corporate torts.114 Notably, they distance their analysis from the familiar entry 
point of examining the effect of shareholder liability on capital markets: 
In the past, limited liability has generally been seen as a problem of 
corporate law. . . . Consequently, the formal boundaries of the corporation 
that have been established for purposes of contractual rights should also 
be respected in tort. One of the principal points we wish to make is that 
this is not so. . . . Rather, shareholder liability should be seen as a 
standard problem of tort law.115 
They instead embrace the least-cost avoider analysis that thrives within agency 
law.116 But that analysis, Hansmann and Kraakman reason, does not apply to 
contract creditors, which can determine and insure themselves against the risks 
posed by limited liability.117 
Independent of its merits,118 Hansmann and Kraakman’s argument is 
ultimately quite conventional. Even when the view of corporate law is set 
aside, veil-piercing remains within the orthodox framework, in which limited 
liability is mutually exclusive of veil-piercing.119 According to them, “[t]o 
 
Agency Law and Contract Formation, 6 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 369, 379 (2004) (“Agency 
law often seems a hybrid of tort and contract.”). 
112 See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text. 
113 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1-2 (1960). 
114 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 58, at 1880-81 (“Changes in technology, 
knowledge, liability rules, and procedures for mass tort litigation have for the first time 
raised the prospect of tort claims that exceed the net worth of even very large 
corporations.”). 
115 Id. at 1916; see also supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. 
116 See Rasmusen, supra note 111, at 369; Eric A. Posner, Agency Models in Law & 
Economics 11 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 92, 
2d Series, 2000), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=204872; cf. United States v. Carroll 
Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (“[I]f the probability be called P; the injury, 
L; and the burden, B; liability depends on whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., 
whether B < PL.”). 
117 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 58, at 1919 (“The case against limited liability in 
tort does not extend to contract. There are compelling reasons for retaining limited liability 
as the background rule for contract creditors.”); see also supra note 101 and accompanying 
text. 
118 See supra note 70. 
119 See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text. 
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decide that there are any circumstances in which shareholders can be held 
liable for tort damages . . . is to discard limited liability in principle. . . . In 
sum, the distinction between ‘liberalized veil-piercing’ and ‘unlimited liability’ 
is largely rhetorical.”120 And once shareholder liability is justified for corporate 
torts, Hansmann and Kraakman maintain, the principles of loss-allocation in 
tort should control veil-piercing.121 
Tort, however, hardly exhausts the scope of shareholder liability.122 
Hansmann and Kraakman may have disavowed the view from corporate law, 
but not that from economic analysis. They apparently have taken their cue 
from Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed’s classic framework, in which 
efficiency considerations govern liability rules, and not initial entitlements.123 
Adjunct to that framework is a general reluctance of economic analysis, as well 
as its hypothesis of an efficient common law,124 to engage real property.125 
 
120 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 58, at 1932. 
121 Id. (“[A]s soon as one has recognized that shareholders can be personally liable for 
corporate torts in principle, one is logically driven to employ general principles of tort law – 
rather than formalities of corporate structure – to determine the scope of their potential 
liability.”). Hansmann and Kraakman do admit that distinguishing between contract and tort 
damages presents “difficulties . . . in areas, such as products liability and workplace 
injuries.” Id. at 1920. But they dismiss such difficulties on the basis that “courts must 
already draw the line between tort and contract in other contexts, such as the enforceability 
of waivers of warranties”; thus, there “should be no need to develop an extensive new 
jurisprudence for this purpose.” Id. at 1921. Moreover, while warranty claims are indeed a 
“freak hybrid born of the illicit intercourse of tort and contract,” William L. Prosser, The 
Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 800 (1966), the 
track record of courts in this regard is hardly exemplary, see, e.g., Glenn D. West & W. 
Benton Lewis, Jr., Contracting to Avoid Extra-Contractual Liability – Can Your 
Contractual Deal Ever Really Be the “Entire” Deal?, 64 BUS. LAW. 999, 1009-10 (2009) 
(“Even since courts have enforced express warranties as contractual promises, many courts 
have continued to recognize a separate tort claim for breaches of those express warranties . . 
. .”). 
122 Indeed, corporate torts arguably do not even exhaust the scope of involuntary creditor 
claims. See Manne, supra note 52, at 263 (explaining that laborers, “[a]s the principal 
victims of industrial accidents, [] formerly constituted the most numerous group of 
involuntary creditors”). In fairness, Hansmann and Kraakman are concerned principally 
with corporate torts, but the pair’s analysis is heavily premised on classic loss-allocation. 
123 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1110 (1972). 
124 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics Movement, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 
1, 5 (1987) (“Common law (i.e., judge-made) rules are often best explained as efforts, 
whether or not conscious, to bring about . . . efficient outcomes.”). 
125 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and 
Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 359 (2001). This is not to say that economic analysis 
cannot explain some aspects of property law, see Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of 
Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 347 (1967), only that the focus tends to be unduly 
narrow in general, and virtually non-existent in corporate law. But see Henry Hansmann & 
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Nevertheless, no positive account of shareholder liability focused exclusively 
on the law of obligations can purport to be complete,126 as real property claims 
can and do support veil-piercing.127 And analyses derived from real property 
principles have yielded some of the more intriguing alternatives to veil-
piercing.128 
In contrast, the neglect of unjust enrichment is not surprising at all. This 
pillar of private law has been kicked aside within common law jurisdictions129 
and dismissed by economic analysis. As a species of restitution,130 unjust 
enrichment concerns gain-based recovery, in contrast to the loss-based 
recovery that preoccupies compensation131: 
The essence of restitutionary claims is often said to be the focus on the 
defendant’s gain as opposed to the plaintiff’s loss. From an economic 
perspective, this is immediately anomalous. Economic analysis generally 
sees legal intervention as a response to conduct that imposes harm . . . . 
[T]he presence of a gain as such is not a reason for the law to become 
concerned.132 
Whereas economic analysis justifies liability on the basis of efficient 
allocation, restitutionary principles resort to disgorgement for fair 
redistribution. With respect to veil-piercing, economic analysis thus has very 
little to say, much less prescribe, about wrongful benefits. 
These omissions are but by-products of the true flaw in veil-piercing. The 
various types of substantive claims all entail certain remedies. Whether these 
 
Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 390 
(2000) (“[O]rganizational law is much more important as property law than as contract 
law.”). 
126 The more natural pairing would seem to be between contract and property, given their 
focus on a particular kind of subject matter, whereas tort law, by virtue of its focus on a 
category of conduct, that is, wrongdoing, has “family ties to criminal, contract, property, 
and regulatory law, not to mention alternative compensation schemes.” 1 DAN B. DOBBS, 
THE LAW OF TORTS § 7, at 10 (2000). 
127 Oh, supra note 3, at 129 tbl.10 (reporting twenty-two real property cases with a veil-
piercing rate of 54.55%, which exceeds that for the overall dataset). 
128 See infra Part II.B. 
129 PETER BIRKS, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 3 (2d ed. 2005) (“Of the subjects which form the 
indispensable foundation of private law, unjust enrichment is the only one to have evaded 
the great rationalization achieved since the middle of the 19th century in both England and 
America . . . .”). 
130 See infra note 151 and accompanying text. 
131 BIRKS, supra note 129, at 3. 
132 Christopher T. Wonnell, Unjust Enrichment and Quasi-Contracts, in 2 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 795, 796 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit de Geest 
eds., 2000) (citations omitted). To be clear, this is not to suggest that the rise of economic 
analysis entirely explains the virtual disappearance of restitution from American academic 
curriculum and discourse. See BIRKS, supra note 129, at 4; infra note 160 and accompanying 
text. 
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remedies are compensatory or restitutionary in nature is less relevant than the 
fact that they apply to the defendant corporation. These remedies are thus 
primary, in that their justification is linked to the nature and properties of the 
initial claim. Only if and when that corporation is incapable of satisfying an 
adverse judgment can a plaintiff then proceed to seek redress from a 
corporation’s shareholder: 
A finding of fact of [veil-piercing] . . . creates no cause of action. It 
merely furnishes a means for a complainant to reach a second corporation 
or individual upon a cause of action that otherwise would have existed 
only against the first corporation. An attempt to pierce the corporate veil 
is a means of imposing liability on an underlying cause of action such as 
a tort or breach of contract.133 
Veil-piercing is thus a secondary remedy that becomes ripe only when there is 
an unenforceable award for its underlying substantive claim: 
 
Figure 3: Veil-Piercing 
 
EX ANTE EX POST 








N/A Unjust Enrichment 
 
Figure 3 properly depicts veil-piercing de-linked from orthodox loss-allocation 
analysis. The scope of shareholder liability, limited or unlimited, is shown in 
privity with obligatory claims, respectively, contract or tort creditors, along 
with their adherent initial remedy in equity or law. Also represented is the 
uncertainty or inapplicability of shareholder liability with, respectively, 
property and unjust enrichment claims.134 All of these columns appear under 
the umbrella of ex ante analysis, as they are driven by efficiency and the policy 
 
133 FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 109, § 41.10, at 136-37 (citations omitted). 
134 The status of property and unjust enrichment are addressed within the framework of 
restitution. See infra notes 149-55 and accompanying text. 
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logic of loss-allocation.135 In contrast, veil-piercing involves an ex post inquiry 
about the equitable need for incidental relief,136 and thus stands alone. 
II. RECONCEIVING PIERCING 
Stripped of the veil of limited liability, piercing reveals its true form. 
Originally conceived as a provisional remedy, piercing was available 
incidentally and only when no relief could be had from a corporation.137 
Inspired by the English chancery system, American legislatures conferred 
courts with discretionary equitable power, unfettered by any concern for the 
type of creditors/claims, corporations, or shareholders, to reverse wrongful 
conduct. This is the essence of the law of restitution. And nothing epitomizes 
the aim and function of this domestically endangered, but nonetheless vital, 
domain better than the constructive trust.138 
This Part explains how to re-conceive piercing as constructive trust. The 
first Section removes the cloud of confusion and obscurity that enshrouds the 
constructive trust, delineating its components and structurally comparing them 
with piercing. The second Section proceeds to flesh out the constructive trust’s 
mechanics and merits relative to the doctrine of substantive consolidation and 
fraudulent transfer law, each of which has been proposed as a potential 
replacement for veil-piercing. 
A. Demystifying the Constructive Trust 
Realizing the equitable nature of piercing reveals a superior remedial option, 
the constructive trust. Considered to be “[b]y all odds the most important 
contribution of equity to the remedies for prevention of enrichment,”139 this 
“purely . . . remedial institution”140 empowers courts to issue an “order 
declaring that the defendant [] holds a disputed asset on trust for the 
 
135 See supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text. 
136 See supra notes 87 and accompanying text. 
137 See, e.g., Corning v. McCullough, 1 N.Y. 47 (1847) (involving a charter that provided 
for joint and several liability only when “a creditor may, after judgment obtained against the 
corporation, and execution returned unsatisfied, sue any stockholder and recover his 
demand”). 
138 See Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1191, 1195 (1995) 
(“To put it bluntly, American lawyers today (judges and law professors included) do not 
know what restitution is. The subject is no longer taught in law schools, and the lawyer who 
lacks an introduction to its basic principles is unlikely to recognize them in practice.”); id. at 
1197 n.17 (“The enfeebled state of American restitution stands in sharp contrast to the 
situation in England, Canada, Australia, and the Commonwealth generally. In all of these 
countries, restitution . . . currently enjoys belated but unprecedented judicial attention and 
academic favor.”). 
139 JOHN P. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 26 (1951). 
140 Roscoe Pound, The Progress of the Law, 1918-1919, 33 HARV. L. REV. 420, 421 
(1920). 
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plaintiff.”141 For centuries, the constructive trust has been an equitable tool 
wielded to enforce judgments via disgorgement.142 
Unfortunately, like veil-piercing, this device is often misunderstood. As a 
preliminary matter, the constructive trust is not even a proper trust: 
An express trust and a constructive trust are not divisions of the same 
fundamental concept. They are not species of the same genus. They are 
distinct concepts. A constructive trust does not, like an express trust, arise 
because of a manifestation of an intention to create it, but it is imposed as 
a remedy to prevent unjust enrichment. A constructive trust, unlike an 
express trust, is not a fiduciary relation . . . .143 
Instead, the constructive trust is a “species of equitable remedy, comparable in 
function to the injunction or decree of specific performance.”144 No element of 
consent is necessary because a constructive trust is judicially imposed;145 a 
court simply declares that a defendant holds a disputed asset for the benefit of 
a plaintiff.146 The result is a fictional trust,147 where the wrongfully deprived 
 
141 Anthony Duggan, Constructive Trusts from a Law and Economics Perspective, 55 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 217, 217 (2005); see also supra note 31. 
142 As with veil-piercing, see supra note 2, the precise origins of the constructive trust are 
unknown. Compare 1 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 1.3, at 9-10 (1978) 
(“The beginnings of constructive trust can be found in seventeenth century English cases . . . 
[many of which] arose out of the Statute of Frauds of 1677 . . . .”), with DAWSON, supra note 
139, at 26 (describing the constructive trust as having “emerged from the fog of eighteenth-
century equity”). The earliest American judicial reference to the constructive trust appeared 
in Lessee of Thompson v. White, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 424, 427 (Pa. 1789) (“[W]here there has 
been a fraud in gaining a conveyance from another, the grantee may be considered as a mere 
trustee.”). See also Swearingham v. Stull’s Ex’rs, 4 H. & McH. 38, 40 (Md. 1797) (“[T]his 
Court, when the ends of justice required it, hath always raised a constructive trust, and 
compelled the trustee to perform it . . . .”). 
143 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION: QUASI-CONTRACTS AND CONSTRUCTIVE 
TRUSTS § 160 cmt. a (1937); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 55 cmt. b (2011) (“It is commonly repeated that a constructive trust is ‘not a 
real trust’ since it is ‘only a remedy.’ One might go further and explain that the term 
‘constructive trust’ . . . is only a manner of speaking.”). 
144 John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 
631 (1995); see also infra note 159. 
145 A. J. OAKLEY, CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS 1 (2d ed. 1987) (“Unlike all other trusts, a 
constructive trust is imposed by the court as a result of the conduct of the trustee and 
therefore arises quite independently of the intention of any of the parties.”); George P. 
Costigan, Jr., The Classification of Trusts as Express, Resulting, and Constructive, 27 
HARV. L. REV. 437, 448, 450 (1914) (“Express trusts and resulting trusts are trusts by the 
real or the presumed intention of the parties, but . . . a constructive trust is a law-imposed 
trust.” (footnote omitted)). 
146 See PALMER, supra note 142, § 1.4, at 26 (Cumulative Supp. No. 2 1998) (asserting 
that a plaintiff-beneficiary need not even “expressly seek a constructive trust for the court to 
exercise its equitable powers and grant one”).   
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plaintiff is a “beneficiary” and the wrongful acquirer is deemed to be a 
“trustee.”148 
Further, the constructive trust is not restricted to unjust enrichment. Within 
the United States, the constructive trust is conventionally regarded “as a means 
of correcting wrongdoing or remedying unjust enrichment.”149 This unduly 
narrow conception of the constructive trust stems from a traditional account of 
civil restitution as a means for exclusively redressing unjust enrichment.150 
That account once was espoused avidly by Peter Birks, who renounced it just 
prior to his death, having realized that obligations can warrant restitution.151 
Birks, though, left intact the unique status accorded to property. Within his 
expanded account, civil law is divided entirely between the dual goals of 
 
147 GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 471, at 8 (rev. 2d 
ed. 1978) (“A constructive trust, or as frequently called an involuntary trust, is a fiction of 
equity.”). The relationship between the constructive trust and the law of trusts is akin to that 
between quasi-contracts and the law of contracts. BIRKS, supra note 34, at 22 (“[I]n relation 
to the restitutionary event the terms chiefly relied upon are ‘quasi-contract’ and 
‘constructive trust.’ . . . ‘Quasi-’ and ‘constructive’ have the same sense.”); see also supra 
note 34 and accompanying text. 
148 The constructive trustee also is not subject to any fiduciary duties, as is the case with 
actual trusts. SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 33, § 462, at 304 (“[A] court of equity does 
not treat the constructive trustee for all purposes as though he were in reality a trustee . . . it 
will not impose upon him the numerous fiduciary obligations that are imposed upon the 
trustee of an express trust.”). 
149 Langbein, supra note 144, at 631; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION 
AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT, § 55 cmt. b (2011) (“A court has the power to reassign title . . . as 
a means of rectifying unjust enrichment.”); Duggan, supra note 141, at 219 (“In Canada, the 
courts, following the United States [sic] lead, have developed the ‘remedial’ constructive 
trust to prevent unjust enrichment. . . . The remedial constructive trust is not part of English 
or Australian law.”). 
150 See BIRKS, supra note 34, at 17 (“Restitution and unjust enrichment identify exactly 
the same area of law. The one term simply quadrates with the other.”); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT, § 1 cmt. b (“The law of 
restitution is predominantly the law of unjust enrichment . . . .”). While acknowledging that 
“the law of restitution is very far from imposing liability for every instance of what might 
plausibly be called unjust enrichment,” and that “the concepts of unjust enrichment and 
restitution (in the literal meaning of ‘restoration’) correlate only imperfectly,” the drafters of 
the new Restatement maintain that “the terms of ‘restitution’ and ‘unjust enrichment’ . . . 
generally be treated as synonymous.” Id. § 1 cmts. b & c.  
151 BIRKS, supra note 129, at 4 (“The law of gain-based recovery is larger than the law of 
unjust enrichment. Every unjust enrichment gives rise to a right to restitution and therefore 
belongs in the law of restitution. But that proposition cannot be turned around . . . .”); see 
also Andrew Burrows, Foreword to BIRKS, supra note 129, at vii (“This new edition was 
important to [Birks] and, with characteristic commitment, he was still working on it, despite 
ever-failing health, until a few days before he died.”); cf. BIRKS, supra note 34, at 25 
(“Restitution is not the only mechanism against unjust enrichment. . . . [I]t might equally be 
said that prevention (by deterrence and anticipation) should be contrasted with reversal (by 
restitution).”). 
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compensation and restitution,152 which translate respectively into obligations 
(that is, contract and tort) and unjust enrichment.153 Property, the fourth pillar 
of private law, thus would appear to be neglected in a manner reminiscent of 
veil-piercing.154 The comparison would be apt if property was conceived of as 
a substantive claim; instead, according to Birks, property represents a class of 
remedies, namely those in rem, as distinguished from those in personam.155 
These conceptual shifts provide some crucial keys to veil-piercing. Because 
restitution functions to complement, and not supplant, compensation, in rem 
relief is incidental to the ordinary means for compensating breaches of contract 
or tortious wrongs.156 This supporting remedial role goes a long way toward 
explaining property’s negligible presence as a substantive claim within veil-
piercing cases,157 as well as the abundance of veil-piercing requests arising in 
contract over tort.158 Only when the initial remedy, in equity or at law, is 
ineffectual will restitutionary remedies be applied, which is the precise 
function performed by the constructive trust.159 
 
152 See BIRKS, supra note 129, at 11 (“‘Restitution’ and ‘compensation’ are partners. 
Compensation is loss-based recovery. Restitution is gain-based recovery.”). 
153 See BIRKS, supra note 34, at 53-55 (depicting “the entire subject of restitution” as 
comprising wrongs and unjust enrichment, with consent encompassing most contracts, and 
other events, including the constructive trust, comprising “residue”); BIRKS, supra note 129, 
at 21 (referencing four categories of civil wrongs, “torts, equitable wrongs, breaches of 
statutory duty not amounting to a tort, and breaches of contract,” which can be formulated 
as “manifestations of consents and wrongs” occurring before “unjust enrichments”). 
154 See supra notes 24, 121-30 and accompanying text. 
155 BIRKS, supra note 34, at 49-53; BIRKS, supra note 129, at 28-30.  
156 See Robert Chambers, Constructive Trusts in Canada, 37 ALTA. L. REV. 173, 181-82 
(1999) (“Where the consequences mean that restitution is potentially available, the law faces 
two questions . . . is this the sort of wrong which gives the victim a right to restitution and, if 
so, should that right be (or include) a right in rem (a constructive trust) or merely a right in 
personam (to an account of profits or restitutionary damages)?”). 
157 See supra notes 106-09, 123-27 and accompanying text. 
158 See supra note 102 and accompanying text. But see David Millon, The Still-Elusive 
Quest to Make Sense of Veil-Piercing, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 25-27 (2009) (asserting that veil-
piercing claims may arise less often in tort because of a smaller universe of potential 
creditors as well as the availability of liability insurance). This observation also may explain 
the relative paucity of veil-piercing grounded in unjust enrichment, which is disfavored as 
compared to contract. See BIRKS, supra note 34, at 47 (“[T]he plaintiff can never put himself 
in a better position by suing in unjust enrichment rather than in contract. Otherwise the law 
of restitution would subvert bargains.”). 
159 David Hayton, Personal Accountability of Strangers as Constructive Trustees, 27 
MALAYA L. REV. 313, 314 (1985) (describing the constructive trust as “a fiction which 
provides a useful remedy where no remedy is available in contract or in tort”); see also 
Duggan, supra note 141, at 217 (“[S]ometimes the constructive trust serves . . . a 
‘perfectionary’ function: the court grants the remedy to enforce an express or implied 
bargain between [plaintiff] and [defendant].” (citing Chambers, supra note 156, at 183)). 
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The remedy thus is detached from the underlying claim’s dynamics. 
Whether the suit involves a substantive claim grounded in contract, property, 
tort, or unjust enrichment, or concerns a voluntary or involuntary creditor, has 
no bearing on the application of a constructive trust.160 To qualify as a 
constructive beneficiary, a plaintiff simply must be deprived of an asset 
through some wrongful means.161 Accordingly, all that matters is whether the 
process by which the asset was misappropriated warrants equitable relief. 
This orientation to process extends to the defendant’s enrichment. As a 
species of restitution, the constructive trust concerns the propriety of benefits, 
not losses.162 Accordingly, the nature and extent of the harm caused by a 
misappropriated asset is not relevant.163 All that matters is whether the 
retention and enjoyment of the asset is sufficiently wrongful to justify its return 
to the plaintiff.164 
Moreover, the constructive-trust inquiry is not party-specific. Because the 
focus is on the status of the misappropriated asset, it is simply “traced” from 
the initial wrongdoer to its ultimate custodian.165 Provided the transfer was not 
 
160 See supra note 145 and accompanying text. But cf. Saul Levmore, Explaining 
Restitution, 71 VA. L. REV. 65, 67-68 (1975) (performing an economic analysis of the entire 
law of restitution with a focus on the cause of action, not the choice of remedy, which 
parallels loss-allocation analysis). 
161 The constructive trust also addresses transactions that the law treats as ineffective or 
productive of wrongful gain, such as those that are invalid by reason of mistake. See, e.g., 
Michigan v. Little River Band of Ottawa Indians, No. 5:05-CV-95, 2006 WL 2092415, at *4 
(W.D. Mich. July 26, 2006) (“The party seeking to have a constructive trust imposed bears 
the burden of establishing fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, undue influence, duress, 
or some other circumstance that would make it inequitable for the holder of legal title to 
retain the property.”); Costigan, supra note 145, at 451 (“[W]hether fraudulent retention is 
called actual fraud or constructive fraud, it is sufficient justification for raising a 
constructive trust.”). 
162 ROBERT GOFF & GARETH JONES, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 14 (2d ed. 1978) (“The 
object of a restitutionary claim is to strip a defendant of a benefit which he has unjustly 
gained at the plaintiff’s expense.”); see also supra notes 151-152 and accompanying text. 
163 Cf. BIRKS, supra note 129, at 39 (“Every problem in unjust enrichment can be 
unlocked by asking these five questions: (i) Was the defendant enriched? (ii) Was it at the 
expense of this claimant? (iii) Was it unjust? (iv) What kind of right did the claimant 
acquire? (v) Does the defendant have a defence?”). 
164 See infra notes 237-41 and accompanying text. 
165 See OAKLEY, supra note 145, at 8 (“[T]he imposition of a constructive trust gives rise 
to the relationship of trustee and beneficiary which, on any view, is sufficient to satisfy the 
prerequisites of such an equitable tracing claim.”). There are multiple conceptions of 
tracing, which have been described in a variety of confusing ways. See, e.g., 2 DAN B. 
DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 6.1, at 11-26 (2d ed. 
1993) (discussing different tracing methods for various scenarios). The constructive trust is 
compatible with any of these conceptions, but arguably the most clear and precise account 
has been formulated by Lionel Smith, whose “rules-based tracing” focuses on value, rather 
than assets or property, and consists of two distinct processes: following and claiming. See 
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on a bona fide basis,166 whatever party currently holds the asset will qualify as 
a constructive trustee. And even if altered or substituted, the asset nevertheless 
will be subject to a proprietary claim that can result in disgorgement.167 
The constructive trust is thus structurally suited to classic veil-piercing 
scenarios. Unlike orthodox loss-allocation analysis, which sifts through the 
different types of creditors/claims, corporations, and shareholders to determine 
when an exception should be made,168 the constructive trust takes all of these 
variables as given. By focusing on whether a corporation’s inability to satisfy a 
judgment results in an unjustifiable allocation of benefits, the principles 
governing the constructive trust entirely avoid the pitfall of trying to justify a 
remedy by resorting to attributes of the original claim.169 And the inquiry is 
sufficiently flexible to accommodate any transfer of benefit from a corporation 
to its shareholder(s).170 
B. Dismantling the Alternatives 
To revamp veil-piercing via extra-corporate principles is hardly a radical 
proposition. Indeed, this tack has been attempted numerous times over the 
years. One notable attempt resorts to bankruptcy, which features a triad of 
corporate disregard doctrines – equitable subordination, substantive 
consolidation, and veil-piercing – each of which is designed for specific 
situations.171 In a spirited exchange with Judge Richard Posner, Jonathan 
Landers endeavored to unify these doctrines in relation to parent-subsidiary 
and affiliate corporate arrangements.172 For Landers, veil-piercing amounts to 
 
LIONEL D. SMITH, THE LAW OF TRACING 10 (1997) (distinguishing “following,” an entirely 
factual and mechanical exercise that “is not a claim or a right in itself” and “does not make 
anyone liable,” from “claiming,” a justificatory exercise that determines whether liability 
should attach along with the award of certain proprietary rights to a victim). 
166 OAKLEY, supra note 145, at 8 (“[I]t is not possible to maintain an equitable tracing 
claim [against] . . . a bona fide purchaser of a legal interest in the property for value without 
notice of the adverse claim of the beneficiary under the constructive trust.”). 
167 See SMITH, supra note 165, at 6 (“Tracing identifies a new thing as the potential 
subject matter of a claim, on the basis that it is the substitute for an original thing which was 
itself the subject matter of a claim.”); R. M. Goode, The Right to Trace and Its Impact in 
Commercial Transactions – I, 92 L.Q. REV. 360, 370 (1976) (“[T]he right to follow denotes 
a right to trace the asset into a changed form . . . .”). 
168 See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text. 
169 See supra notes 156-61 and accompanying text. 
170 See infra notes 244, 267-69 and accompanying text. 
171 See Landers, supra note 60, at 590 (“Although all have a common source in the 
division of one business into more than one corporate entity, these . . . situations have 
commonly been analyzed individually under the legal rubrics of equitable subordination, 
piercing the corporate veil, and consolidation of related bankrupts.”). 
172 See id. at 589-90; Posner, supra note 54, at 499-500 (arguing that Landers’ “neglect 
of economic principles vital to an understanding of credit transactions, limited liability, and 
corporate affiliation undermines both his general approach and his specific conclusions”).  
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an inadequate “viability-procedural observance analysis,” in which courts 
determine whether a defendant corporation was actually a viable business that 
has been held out publicly as such.173 According to Landers, this approach is 
inferior to substantive consolidation.174 
Nevertheless, Landers’ effort leaves much to be desired. On the one hand, 
substantive consolidation is over-inclusive, because the assets and liabilities of 
all related entities are pooled together, with the result that “some general 
creditors fare better and others worse.”175 On the other hand, substantive 
consolidation is under-inclusive, because the doctrine does not reach beyond 
formal bankruptcy.176 Moreover, Landers’ analysis of veil-piercing is 
essentially a case study of the orthodox loss-allocation approach and its 
pitfalls. Preoccupied with preserving limited liability, veil-piercing assumes 
the familiar form of a mutually exclusive exception;177 accordingly, the only 
apparent option for salvaging veil-piercing is for Landers to rearrange the 
 
The exchange emerged during a visit at the University of Chicago Law School by Landers, 
who recounts that “the issues discussed [within this triad of articles] became somewhat of a 
cause célèbre.” Jonathan M. Landers, Another Word on Parents, Subsidiaries and Affiliates 
in Bankruptcy, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 527, 527 n.† (1976).      
173 Landers, supra note 60, at 621, 623 (“The model for corporateness requires both 
economic viability and the observance of certain procedural formalities. While this proposed 
test is not precise or capable of quantification, it is possible to reconcile most of the piercing 
cases by reference to its criteria.”). 
174 Id. at 633-34 (rejecting veil-piercing on the basis that the multiple enterprise factors 
are based “on the largely mythical theory that the owners will respect the corporate integrity 
of constituent companies”). Landers ultimately concludes, however, that no complete 
unitary approach is possible. Id. at 652 (“[A] theory of complete fusion . . . would be in 
direct conflict with the corporate law that permits separate incorporation of subsidiaries and 
related companies . . . .”). 
175 Douglas G. Baird, Substantive Consolidation Today, 47 B.C. L. REV. 5, 6 (2005); see 
also Union Sav. Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co., 860 F.2d 515, 519 (2d Cir. 1988) 
(applying an even stricter test for substantive consolidation that requires proving its 
inurement to the benefit of all creditors). 
176 In fairness, Landers explicitly is concerned only with the fragmentation of corporate 
disregard doctrines within federal bankruptcy law. But even he recognizes a “dearth of 
bankruptcy authority on the veil piercing question,” the orientation of which to state law and 
limited liability statutes represents “practical constraints [that] make a consistent judicial 
rule based on economic reality impossible.” Landers, supra note 60, at 625-26. Regardless, 
even within bankruptcy, substantive consolidation “lacks the solid foundation one usually 
expects of doctrines so firmly embedded in day-to-day practice” and “lives in a peculiar 
nether-world” between fraudulent conveyance and veil-piercing law. Baird, supra note 175, 
at 15, 21. 
177 See Landers, supra note 60, at 623-26 (struggling to reconcile the “basic policy 
behind limited liability,” the logic of contract and tort cases, and “some standard . . . for 
distinguishing cases where piercing is appropriate from those where it is not”); supra Part 
I.A. 
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hodgepodge of existing attenuated factors.178 Given such an awkward and 
limited framework,179 there is no wonder why any kind of alternative, in or out 
of bankruptcy, might seem attractive. 
Another notable effort tries to absorb veil-piercing within the law of 
fraudulent conveyance. Inspired by the similarities Landers identified between 
equitable subordination and veil-piercing, Robert Clark provocatively 
suggested that these doctrines could be viewed as mere permutations of 
fraudulent conveyance.180 Unlike substantive consolidation, the Uniform 
Fraudulent Conveyance Act, its successor, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer 
Act, and the Bankruptcy Code collectively supply protections against attempts 
to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors of corporations within the zone of 
insolvency.181 And, unlike veil-piercing, fraudulent conveyance law provides 
relief that does not require “complete revocation of limited liability,” yet is not 
restricted to the amount of inadequate capitalization.182 
Unfortunately, Clark’s proposal falls short in a number of respects. As a 
preliminary matter, the law of fraudulent conveyance is arguably no less 
amorphous and unsettled than veil-piercing.183 What is clear about fraudulent-
 
178 See Landers, supra note 60, at 621-22 (formulating the viability-procedural 
observance test simply in terms of various factors within the conventional veil-piercing 
test). In Landers’ test, economic viability groups together adequate capitalization and 
siphoning of funds, as well as fraud, misrepresentation, and illegality, whereas procedural 
observance concerns corporate formalities and commingling. Id. 
179 See supra Part I.B; infra Part III.A-B. 
180 Robert Charles Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 HARV. 
L. REV. 505, 505 (1977) (“In particular, the doctrines of equitable subordination and 
piercing the corporate veil may be seen as applications of the same notions of securing the 
moral obligations of debtors to creditors which are at work in fraudulent conveyance law.”). 
More precisely, Clark regards equitable subordination as “a functional substitute for, though 
not an equivalent of, a trustee action ‘to pierce the corporate veil’ under state law,” id. at 
535, which he contends is an application of fraudulent conveyance law. 
181 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (2006); UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(1), 7A 
U.L.A. 58 (2006); UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 7, 7A U.L.A. 378 (2006) 
(withdrawn 1984). 
182 See Clark, supra note 180, at 547 (“[A]ffirmatively responding to plaintiff’s requests 
to pierce the veil in either of these ways may fail to compensate completely outside creditors 
for harm wrongfully caused them if the personal assets of the defendants are insufficient to 
fill the need.”). 
183 See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its 
Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829, 830 (1985) (“The difficulty that courts and 
legislatures have faced for hundreds of years has been one of trying to define what kinds of 
transactions hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.”); Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and 
Its Discontents: The Dynamics of Financial Product Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1553, 1620 (2008) (“[T]he limitless generality of fraudulent transfer law precludes any 
definition more systematic than that previously offered: it is the residual tool by which 
courts have policed undesirable debtor behavior when no more specialized tool is at hand.”). 
One critique of Clark’s approach is that “bounded rationality, the institutional constraints on 
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conveyance provisions is that they can be circumvented quite easily by 
disguising an asset transfer as a distribution of dividends.184 Clark 
commendably acknowledged this problem, for which he offers only a largely 
aspirational prescription that “court[s] can and should hold that . . . fraudulent 
conveyance rules preempt the dividend rules of state corporation laws.”185 But 
this seemingly simple fix actually opens up a Pandora’s Box of problems. To 
expand fraudulent conveyance law in this way effectively would render 
ordinary corporate transactions, in or out of bankruptcy, hostage to creditors, 
as even a proper distribution might qualify as a transaction.186 Indeed, even 
without such an expansion, current fraudulent conveyance law arguably 
regards all sorts of valid transactions, such as leveraged buyouts, to be 
injurious to creditors.187 So instead of the “shotgun remedy” supplied by veil-
piercing,188 Clark has recommended a blunt sledgehammer. 
 
judicial decisionmaking, and the incentives to shirk from agency cost theory, all argue for 
ways to decide [veil-piercing] cases using minimal effort,” and thus might suggest that 
“[s]lapping the requisite veil piercing epithet on a case is just a shortcut, and doing so is far 
more consistent with judicial incentives than puzzling through the complexities of 
fraudulent transfer law.” Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 523. Whether the complexity of 
fraudulent transfer law exceeds that of the current veil-piercing test, with its laundry list of 
attenuated factors, is a close call. But the framing of a suit is a choice that primarily lies with 
the plaintiff, who has incentives to select the most promising test, and not the judge. 
Regardless, Bainbridge’s criticism fails to engage the merits of Clark’s approach, and 
simply represents a debatable explanation for the status quo that he too would prefer to 
avoid. 
184 Landers, supra note 60, at 596 (“Since any gratuitous distribution to a related 
company constitutes a dividend, the law of fraudulent conveyances provides little protection 
for creditors beyond that already provided in state corporation statutes forbidding dividends 
that invade capital or that will render a corporation insolvent.”). 
185 Clark, supra note 180, at 558. Clark subsequently has touted that his “argument now 
has case law support.” CLARK, supra note 11, § 2.5, at 89 (citing Wells Fargo Bank v. 
Desert View Bldg. Supplies, Inc., 475 F. Supp. 693 (D. Nev. 1978), aff’d mem. op., 633 
F.2d 221 (9th Cir. 1980)). But, almost a quarter century later, no other case appears to have 
followed suit, which may be because current fraudulent conveyance law is “concerned 
[with] individual rather than corporate debtors,” and thus ill-prepared to deal with routine 
transfers such as distributions. Baird & Jackson, supra note 183, at 832. 
186 See Baird & Jackson, supra note 183, at 834 (“Treating transfers by a debtor that 
make creditors as a group worse off as fraudulent conveyances is overbroad because many 
ordinary transfers that a debtor makes do this.”); id. at 853 (describing a scenario where a 
“firm issues new preferred debt and then uses the proceeds as a dividend,” and concluding 
that “there seems to be little reason for fraudulent conveyance law to control” the 
distribution for lax creditors). A more sinister possibility is that fraudulent conveyance law 
gives creditors an incentive to void relevant transactions that ultimately may release their 
own obligations. 
187 See id. at 834 (“If one applies fraudulent conveyance law to leveraged buyouts . . . 
one might work counter to the interests of those creditors who, before the fact, would have 
wanted their debtor to have the power to enter into such transactions.”); id. at 850-53 
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In contrast, the constructive trust represents a surgical knife. Transforming a 
defendant into a constructive trustee confers the plaintiff-beneficiary with a 
choice of two remedies: (1) the constructive trustee may be held personally 
liable for essentially what amounts to a breach of trust, or (2) the plaintiff-
beneficiary may exercise proprietary rights to the misappropriated assets.189 
Which remedy applies is an election made on an ex post basis,190 and thus the 
plaintiff-beneficiary can make an informed decision about how to maximize 
recovery. 
When the constructive trustee is solvent, the choice turns on the asset’s 
value. On the one hand, if the misappropriated property has depreciated, its 
original value can be recovered by holding the constructive trustee personally 
liable.191 On the other hand, if the misappropriated property has appreciated, 
the original value and its identifiable fruits can be recovered by exercising the 
plaintiff-beneficiary’s proprietary rights.192 
An insolvent constructive trustee also presents a clear choice. Because the 
remedy of personal liability will result in the claim ranking with, rather than 
ahead of, general unsecured creditors, 
the only situation in which the beneficiary is likely to choose to rely on 
the personal liability of the constructive trustee . . . will be where the 
property which is the subject matter of the constructive trust has fallen in 
value to a percentage of its original value smaller than the percentage that 
is likely to be paid out by the trustee in bankruptcy to the general 
creditors.193 
Otherwise, the proprietary rights will push the plaintiff-beneficiary to the 
front of the general, unsecured line;194 this “valuable trump” is thus essentially 
 
(demonstrating how fraudulent conveyance law distorts arm’s-length transactions in 
leveraged buyouts). 
188 Clark, supra note 180, at 547 (“The piercing cases appear to employ a shotgun 
remedy, that is, a remedy less precisely responsive than those invoked in fraudulent 
conveyance cases, but one more biased toward a punitive result than those invoked by the 
doctrine of equitable subordination.”). 
189 See OAKLEY, supra note 145, at 1 (“[W]hen property is declared to be the subject-
matter of a constructive trust, the imposition of that trust produces liabilities both of a 
proprietary and of a personal nature for the constructive trustee.”). 
190 See, e.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 549 (N.Y. 1928) (imposing a 
constructive trust that presented plaintiff with an ex post option to receive shares or join a 
misappropriated lease). 
191 OAKLEY, supra note 145, at 5-6. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. at 6; see also id. at 6 n.13 (adding that when the property has depreciated at the 
hands of the constructive trustee, “it will always be in the beneficiary’s interest . . . to both 
recover the property and claim damages for the fall in its value”). 
194 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 33, § 481.2, at 398 (“In a great many of the cases in 
which the owner of property seeks to follow it and impress a constructive trust or equitable 
lien upon the product of the property . . . the claimant is given priority over the general 
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a priority accorded to the plaintiff-beneficiary,195 and will be almost 
“inevitably cho[sen].”196 
The priority can be justified on a number of grounds. From a property rights 
standpoint, the constructive trust represents a pre-bankruptcy claim on a 
misappropriated asset that must be forfeited by its current holder, who 
possesses bare legal title.197 Similarly, from a relative-entitlements standpoint, 
the priority serves to protect the superior constructive trust claim that the 
plaintiff-beneficiary did or would possess outside of bankruptcy.198 
Additionally, from a corrective-justice standpoint, the priority denies general 
unsecured creditors the ability to benefit unjustifiably from an asset that 
otherwise would not be available for distribution.199 
III. PIERCING VIA THE CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST 
Traditional veil-piercing is replete with distinctions and factors. Scenarios 
typically are classified along the lines of whether they involve voluntary or 
involuntary creditors/claims, close or public corporations, and individual or 
corporate shareholders.200 Even the simplest scenarios are analyzed through the 
prism of numerous factors that themselves may be mere proxies for certain 
phenomena. Navigating through all these scenarios can be a rather daunting 
exercise. 
This Part takes a sleeker approach to demonstrating how the constructive 
trust can be applied in lieu of veil-piercing. Unlike orthodox loss-allocation 
analysis, the constructive trust operates independent of the type of 
 
creditors of the wrongdoer.”). 
195 HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION 297 (2004) (“If this 
restitution claimant succeeds in asserting . . . a constructive trust . . . she can simply reclaim 
what is deemed to be equitably hers. Thus, this fortunate claimant gets, in effect, a priority . 
. . .”). 
196 OAKLEY, supra note 145, at 6-7. 
197 See Andrew Kull, Restitution in Bankruptcy: Reclamation and Constructive Trust, 72 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 265, 287 (1998) (“A decree that certain assets are held in constructive trust 
for the benefit of a claimant means that, in the judgment of the court, the claimant has a 
right of ownership in those assets superior to that of the person with possession and legal 
title.”). 
198 Duggan, supra note 141, at 246 (“Applying the relative entitlements theory[,] . . . 
since [plaintiff’s] constructive trust claim would have had priority over the claim of an 
execution creditor outside [defendant’s] bankruptcy, it prevails over unsecured creditors 
inside [defendant’s] bankruptcy.”). 
199 Emily L. Sherwin, Constructive Trusts in Bankruptcy, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 297, 332. 
But see Kull, supra note 197, at 288-89 (criticizing Sherwin’s claim that “it is wrong to 
regard the constructive trust claim as having an equitable interest in property, or to consider 
that a constructive trust has any existence apart from its judicial declaration” as being based 
on “a purported analysis in terms of property interests [that] is unduly formalistic and 
ultimately arbitrary”). 
200 See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text. 
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creditor/claim, corporation, or shareholder involved in the original suit; the 
relevant inquiry instead is the flow of unjustified benefits. Accordingly, classic 
veil-piercing scenarios can be organized by the dimensional flow of assets (1) 
horizontally from a corporation to a controlling shareholder, (2) vertically from 
a subsidiary up to a parent corporation, and (3) diagonally from a corporation 
to an affiliate or sibling via or at the behest of a common controlling 
shareholder. Each of these dimensions also is connected with a different 
component of the traditional veil-piercing test, with the net result taking into 
account all possible types of factors. Across this triad of increasingly complex 
scenarios, the constructive trust is shown to yield comparable, if not superior, 
results than traditional veil-piercing. 
A. One Dimension 
The most basic scenario features a corporation with one shareholder. As one 
court has stated: “In all the experience of the law, there has never been a more 
prolific breeder of fraud than the one-man corporation. It is a favorite device 
for the escape of personal liability.”201 Whether that is empirically accurate or 
not,202 the presence of only one shareholder does simplify conventional veil-
piercing by effectively dispensing with any need to determine whether 
sufficient control or domination exists. The inquiry thus is streamlined toward 
evidence of intent to commit some kind of fraud, wrong, or injustice.203 
This evidence can assume many forms, all of which are problematic. 
Despite its intuitive relevance, fraud or misrepresentation is not dispositive, 
much less required, in all jurisdictions.204 What constitutes a sufficient 
showing, actually or constructively,205 has produced inconsistent results that 
 
201 In re Dixie Splint Coal Co., 31 F. Supp. 283, 288 (W.D. Va. 1937); see also Bernard 
F. Cataldo, Limited Liability with One-Man Companies and Subsidiary Corporations, 18 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 473, 482 (1953) (“These sentiments [toward corporate disregard] 
have special significance with respect to one-man companies . . . . His complete dominion 
and superior knowledge carry opportunities for manipulation and maneuvering.”). 
202 See Thompson, supra note 17, at 1055 tbl.7 (reporting that veil-piercing cases most 
frequently involve parent-subsidiary structures, but the highest success rate concerns 
requests against only one individual shareholder and that the “differences between the one, 
two or three person corporations, and the other close corporations are statistically 
significant”). 
203 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. The proximate-causation requirement is 
omitted here to sharpen the substantive contrast with constructive-trust analysis. The harm-
or-loss requirement is discussed in Part III.B. 
204 Compare FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 109, § 41.25, at 165 (stating that “corporate 
existence can be disregarded without a specific showing of fraud” and providing supporting 
cases), with Iceland Telecom, Ltd. v. Info. Sys. & Networks Corp., 268 F. Supp. 2d 585, 
591 (D. Md. 2003) (“[A]ll binding precedent from the state courts of Maryland . . . give this 
Court no example of when a Court should pierce the corporate veil absent a showing of 
fraud . . . .”). 
205 Compare, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Linear Films, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 260, 268 (D. Del. 
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belie an unsettled standard that either challenges courts or presents them with 
an opportunity for results-oriented rulings.206 Indeed, the same difficulty 
plagues undercapitalization, a popular proxy for fraud or misrepresentation.207 
Over time judicial focus on the amount of capital has shifted from the time of 
incorporation to that of the alleged misconduct,208 while morphing into 
something called “financial responsibility”209 and meandering into whether 
funds have been siphoned for a shareholder’s personal use.210 
 
1989) (“Fraud or something like it is required.”), and Menetti v. Chavers, 974 S.W.2d 168, 
174 (Tex. App. 1998) (“[T]he actual fraud requirement [for contractual obligations] should 
be applied, by analogy, to tort claims . . . .”), with Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat 
Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 806, 813 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (“[T]he doctrine does not depend on the 
presence of actual fraud, it is designed to prevent what would be fraud or injustice, if 
accomplished.”). 
206 See, e.g., Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Pepper Source, No. 88 C 4861, 1992 WL 168537, 
at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. July 10, 1992) (deeming evidence that a shareholder engaged in individual 
tax evasion and gave oral assurance that the corporation would pay any freight bills “if there 
were sufficient corporate funds” as constitutive of fraud). 
207 See William P. Hackney & Tracey G. Benson, Shareholder Liability for Inadequate 
Capital, 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 837, 859 (1982) (“There is no question today but that 
inadequate capital is considered by all courts to be one of the most important factors in cases 
imposing liability on shareholders for corporate obligations.”). There is, however, some 
dispute about whether undercapitalization is equally relevant for contract versus tort 
creditors. Compare id. at 867 (“The courts seem more inclined to hold shareholders liable 
for the torts of their corporations than for their contracts when . . . inadequate capitalization 
is present, and the textwriters generally support this position.” (footnote omitted)), with 
Adolf A. Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 343, 349 n.15 (1947) 
(“In all cases insufficient capitalization is persuasive evidence that the enterprise was not 
separate.”). 
208 The shift can be attributed to the relaxation of minimum-capital requirements within 
incorporation statutes down to a nominal amount, if any at all. See Millon, supra note 10, at 
1337 (“Corporation statutes no longer include requirements for minimal initial capitalization 
or ongoing levels of capital.”). 
209 See, e.g., Radaszewski v. Telecom Corp., 981 F.2d 305, 309-10 (8th Cir. 1992) 
(interpreting “capital” as including “financial responsibility”). Harvey Gelb has argued that 
veil-piercing should apply when an entity has been operated in a “financially irresponsible” 
manner. Harvey Gelb, Limited Liability Policy and Veil Piercing, 9 WYO. L. REV. 551, 573 
(2009). This virtual reincarnation of the undercapitalization factor, however, relies entirely 
upon classic loss-allocation analysis. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text. 
Moreover, defining “financially irresponsible” conduct is hardly a simple task and arguably 
would have countervailing economic effects. Cf. LoPucki, supra note 67, at 88-89 
(delineating the negative effects of imposing a financial responsibility requirement on 
entrepreneurs to thwart judgment-proofing strategies). 
210 See, e.g., Pierson v. Jones, 625 P.2d 1085, 1089 n.1 (Idaho 1981) (“As to the issue of 
undercapitalization, the issue is not whether the corporation was initially undercapitalized, 
but whether [defendant] drained the corporate assets for his own use.”). 
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These factors have gone astray because they are misdirected. Although it is 
the most dispositive factor within veil-piercing opinions,211 the absence or 
presence of fraud or misrepresentation does not assert itself as strongly as other 
factors do when couched in a substantive fraud claim.212 This curious reality 
may be explained by judicial confusion about what exactly must be the subject 
of fraud or misrepresentation to justify veil-piercing. Some courts follow the 
orthodox view that fraud or misrepresentation within the original exchange 
between a plaintiff and a corporation obviates the ability to account properly 
for risk.213 But others examine the extent to which peripheral fraud or 
misrepresentation by a shareholder is responsible for a corporation’s inability 
to satisfy a judgment,214 which is what undercapitalization purports to 
establish, albeit indirectly and imperfectly.215 
No such confusion exists with respect to the constructive trust. Imposition of 
this remedy can be triggered by the presence of fraud or misrepresentation, as 
well as concealment, undue influence, or duress.216 Unlike veil-piercing, 
however, the constructive trust inquiry focuses on whether the means by which 
the asset has been transferred renders its retention by the current holder 
unjustified. Because the constructive trust applies only when an initial remedy 
within either equity or law is ineffectual,217 there is no connection with the 
underlying substantive claim. 
These types of wrongful conduct also comport with loss-allocation. The 
opportunity of voluntary creditors to bargain and insure themselves against risk 
generally negates any need for ex post compensation.218 That need clearly 
reasserts itself when the distortive effects of fraud or misrepresentation are 
present.219 Further, concealment, undue influence, and duress are all forms of 
 
211 Oh, supra note 3, at 133-34 tbl.12 (reporting fraud or misrepresentation to be 
dispositive in 989 cases, followed by injustice or unfairness in 890 cases); see also id. at 137 
(presenting evidence of a substitution effect with other rationales when evidence of fraud or 
misrepresentation is absent). 
212 See id. at 136 tbl.13 (reporting a veil-piercing rate for fraud or misrepresentation that 
is lower than when evidence of a sham or shell, siphoning of funds, instrumentality, alter 
ego, or domination is absent or present). 
213 See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 21, at 112. 
214 See, e.g., FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 109, § 41.32, at 196-97 (“In cases of fraud . . . 
the courts may regard the real parties responsible and grant relief against them . . . based on 
the principles of equity.”). 
215 See Hackney & Benson, supra note 207, at 888 (“[T]he remedy of denying limited 
liability goes beyond providing compensation for harm actually traceable to the 
undercapitalization and may yield a punitive result. . . . ‘Piercing the veil’ solely for 
undercapitalization . . . would convert an investor into a guarantor.”). 
216 See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
217 See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
218 See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
219 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 21, at 112 (“Th[e] distinction between contract 
and tort creditors breaks down when the debtor engages in fraud or misrepresentation.”). 
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unconscionable conduct that excuse enforcement of bargains.220 Notably, 
though, none of these excuses recognized by the constructive trust constitutes a 
ground for veil-piercing.221 Accordingly, the wrongful-conduct component can 
yield a more comprehensive and yet precise form of relief for voluntary 
creditors.222 
B. Two Dimensions 
The parent-subsidiary structure presents a more complex scenario. Despite 
the contrary insistence of courts and some scholars,223 the test for veil-piercing 
operates in materially different ways when the controlling shareholder is a 
corporation, rather than an individual.224 This is largely because the additional 
layer of limited liability enjoyed by that shareholder exacerbates the moral-
hazard problem.225 Accordingly, modern loss-allocation analysis, which 
emerged from an exclusive preoccupation with the parent-subsidiary 
 
220 See George S. Geis, Economics as Context for Contract Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 569, 
598 (2008) (reviewing VICTOR GOLDBERG, FRAMING CONTRACT LAW: AN ECONOMIC 
PERSPECTIVE (2006)) (“Parties lacking real intent – through flaws from incapacity, fraud, 
duress, mistake, and so on – should not be able to draw upon the power of the law to back 
their bargains.” (emphasis omitted)). 
221 Cf. supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
222 This component does not include voluntary creditors, but their compensation is 
supplied through the constructive trust’s unjustified enrichment analysis. See infra notes 
237-41 and accompanying text. 
223 See, e.g., HARRY G. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER 
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 148, at 258 (2d ed. 1970) (“Generally-speaking, the principles 
governing one-man, family, and other close corporations are applicable to subsidiary and 
other affiliated corporations.” (footnote omitted)); Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 528 
(“Under current law, the nature of the ultimate shareholder-defendant – corporation or 
natural person – is irrelevant.”). 
224 Empirical studies uniformly find federal and state courts are far more reluctant to 
reach into the personal assets of a corporate, as compared to an individual, shareholder. See 
Matheson, supra note 18, at 1153 (“Piercing [within the parent-subsidiary situation] occurs 
about half as often as in the overall universe of piercing decisions.”); Oh, supra note 3, at 
110 tbl.4 (finding a veil-piercing rate of 41.17% for corporate versus 51.69% for individual 
shareholders); Thompson, supra note 17, at 1055 tbl.7 (finding a veil-piercing rate of 
37.21% for corporate versus 43.13% for individual shareholders). This chasm rebuts a 
broadly held conviction that veil-piercing should prevail more often in the parent-subsidiary 
context. See infra note 227. 
225 See BLUMBERG, supra note 101, at xl (“[M]ost of the presumed advantages of limited 
liability are simply irrelevant where corporate groups are involved.”); Kurt A. Strasser, 
Piercing the Veil in Corporate Groups, 37 CONN. L. REV. 637, 638 (2005) (“While 
traditional corporate law has not articulated different rules for a parent company in its role 
as a shareholder than for individual investor shareholders, parent companies in fact present 
different policy issues and their limited liability should be determined by a different 
analysis.”). 
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scenario,226 believes the presumption of separateness should not apply to 
corporate shareholders.227 
The chief problem lies in determining what constitutes separateness. To 
assess whether a subsidiary is the “alter ego” or “instrumentality” of a parent, 
courts typically examine the extent to which formal corporate practices and 
commingled operations exist.228 This seemingly simple inquiry, however, is 
quite difficult to apply due to the peculiar nature and diverse forms of 
corporate groups.229 Over time courts have developed a checklist of 
circumstantial factors, which are neither weighted nor connected to the 
underlying harm, resulting in a pastiche of unpredictable precedent.230 
One possibility that has enticed but never gained much traction with courts 
is to reconfigure parent-subsidiary relations in terms of agency law.231 Analysis 
along these lines tends to focus on the extent to which a subsidiary qualifies as 
an agent subject to the control of a corporate parent, as a principal, for actions 
taken on its behalf.232 Liability incurred by the subsidiary-agent then might be 
imputed to its parent-principal. This apparent-authority scheme, however, is 
not a perfect fit with veil piercing scenarios, which frequently lack the requisite 
evidence of a traceable manifestation from the principal-parent.233 As a result, 
 
226 See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text. 
227 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 21, at 110-11 (“Courts’ greater willingness to 
allow creditors to reach the assets of corporate as opposed to personal shareholders is . . . 
consistent with economic principles.”); Landers, supra note 60, at 623 (“[C]ourts may have 
a greater proclivity to reach corporate, as opposed to individual, stockholders.”). 
228 E.g., Koch Ref. v. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc., 831 F.2d 1339, 1345 (7th Cir. 
1987) (“Evidence indicative of an alter ego relationship includes . . . intermingling of 
corporate identities or funds.”); see also David H. Barber, Piercing the Corporate Veil, 17 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 371, 377-78 (1981) (“The intent behind the formalities prong of the 
piercing test . . . is to prevent shareholder-owners from impairing the interests of other 
parties by carrying this unity of interest too far.”). 
229 Cf. Millon, supra note 10, at 1361 (stating that “corporate shareholders do not 
participate in control of the firm simply by virtue of their status as such” but instead 
“exercise control only indirectly”). 
230 See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text. 
231 See Robert B. Thompson, Agency Law and Asset Partitioning, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 
1321, 1326-42 (2003) (examining applicability of agency law generally in connection with 
limited liability, as well as specifically with respect to parent-subsidiary structures). 
232 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2005) (“Agency is the fiduciary 
relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person 
(an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s 
control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.”); cf. Mendelson, 
supra note 49, at 1206 (proposing a variant of agency-based analysis whereby “a 
shareholder with the capacity to control would be fully responsible for corporate torts or 
statutory violations” when the amount of vicariously generated liability exceeds corporate 
assets). 
233 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 (“Apparent authority is the power held 
by an agent or other actor to affect a principal’s legal relations with third parties when a 
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agency principles tend to be merely “metaphorical or rhetorical [devices] . . . 
relied upon simply to justify a conclusion that, for some other reason, liability 
should follow from shareholder control.”234 
Instead the constructive trust shifts the focus from liability to benefit. The 
contours of agency law conform to the least-cost-avoider formula, of which 
orthodox loss-allocation analysis is a mere variant.235 In this vein, veil-piercing 
involves an attempt to specify objective bases for imposing personal liability 
on a shareholder. But, as evidenced by current judicial efforts, properly 
defining these bases is a notoriously difficult fact-intensive inquiry that makes 
veil-piercing ill-suited to summary judgment.236 Rather than trying to 
determine what attributes should expose a shareholder to liability, the 
constructive trust focuses on whether the ultimate holder should retain the 
proceeds flowing from title to a misappropriated asset. 
That holder is converted into a constructive trustee upon proof that the 
retention constitutes unjustified enrichment. Unlike liability and its implicit 
deterrence framework, benefit-oriented analysis concerns explicit validity. In 
essence, the custodian of a misappropriated asset must articulate a principled 
reason against disgorgement.237 The universe of invalid reasons for enrichment 
ranges from participatory grounds, such as nullity, terminability, and 
voidability,238 to non-participatory grounds, such as wrongful benefits received 
either absolutely involuntarily or knowingly.239 In contrast to veil-piercing, 
 
third party reasonably believes the actor has authority to act on behalf of the principal and 
that belief is traceable to the principal’s manifestations.”); cf. Krendl & Krendl, supra note 
6, at 3 n.9 (embracing Judge Learned Hand’s position that “express agency would not 
provide a remedy because the consensual element would be lacking and . . . implied agency 
would be inappropriate because that would mean that the veil would be pierced in every 
situation” (citing Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co., 31 F.2d 265 (2d 
Cir. 1929))). 
234 Millon, supra note 10, at 1332. 
235 See supra notes 116-21 and accompanying text. 
236 See, e.g., Am. Mgmt. Corp. v. Dunlap, 784 F. Supp. 1245, 1248 (N.D. Miss. 1992) 
(“Whether it is a defendant who seeks to preserve a corporate shield over him, or a plaintiff 
who is attempting to pierce the corporate veil, corporate disregard often raises genuine 
issues of material fact, thus making summary judgment inappropriate.”). 
237 See BIRKS, supra note 129, at 43 (“There is a limited range of recognized 
explanations. If the putative explanation is invalid or if there never was even a putative 
explanation, the enrichment is sine causa, it lacks the required explanatory basis and must 
be given up.”). 
238 Id. at 126 (“[T]he enrichment cannot be unjust until the other has brought the contract 
to an end. . . . Subject to that caveat, nullity, termination, terminability, and voidability all 
suffice to show that an enrichment has no valid basis. Mere unenforceability does not.”); see 
also id. at 142-54 (examining inadequate participatory bases within contract, trust, and gift 
contexts). 
239 Id. at 155 (“In general, an absolutely involuntary enrichment will have no explanatory 
basis at all.”); id. at 157 (“In the absence of a cogent explanation to the contrary, to insist on 
fault is to disapply the law of unjust enrichment in favour of the law of wrongs. The 
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then, the “unjust” component to enrichment is not some amorphous set of 
principles,240 but rather “a reason for restitution which is not a manifestation of 
consent and not a wrong.”241 
To see the merits of this approach, return to the mass-risk scenario. 
Subsidiaries that externalize tortious harm generate strong incentives for their 
parents to maintain formalities and segregate operations; as a result, victims 
must pursue corporate agents with typically inadequate means,242 or nervously 
hope that public pressure somehow will impel the parent to assume financial 
responsibility.243 Rather than taking these diversionary courses, the 
constructive-trust inquiry goes straight to whether the parent has benefited 
from the subsidiary’s tortious conduct; to the extent that the underlying benefit 
has been knowingly received by the parent, it must proffer a valid justification 
for retaining those proceeds or else disgorge them. And, unlike veil-piercing, 
this burden is imposed on the parent not by virtue of its status as a (controlling) 
shareholder, but as the current holder of misappropriated assets. Accordingly, 
if some of those assets have been distributed to shareholders or transferred to 
another entity, they will be subject to judicial scrutiny and possible 
disgorgement.244 
The constructive trust thus can do what veil-piercing is supposed to. 
Virtually everyone agrees that the justifications for limited liability do not 
extend to the mass-risk scenario.245 Further, under the orthodox approach, no 
one seriously questions that shareholder liability should protect involuntary 
and tort creditors,246 who are the most compelling candidates for equitable 
relief.247 And the need for such relief is most pronounced against corporate 
 
equitable wrong is ‘knowing receipt.’”). 
240 See BIRKS, supra note 34, at 18-19 (“[T]he word ‘unjust’ . . . invite[s judicial] appeals 
to abstract conceptions of justice from whatever moral and political values might best suit a 
party’s case. . . . In the phrase ‘unjust enrichment’ the word ‘unjust’ might, with a different 
throw of the dice, have been ‘disapproved’ or, more neutrally, ‘reversible’. . . .”). 
241 BIRKS, supra note 129, at 13. 
242 See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text. 
243 See LoPucki, supra note 67, at 52-53 (describing how Exxon Corporation would have 
evaded liability for the Valdez oil spill but for political backlash, and observing that 
“[a]ttempting to predict whether cultural and political constraints will dissipate is a highly 
speculative undertaking”). 
244 Bona fide recipients without notice of an adverse claim, however, would be exempt. 
See supra note 166 and accompanying text. Accordingly, the constructive trust would not 
reach into the personal assets of most shareholders, only those who elect to profit from the 
morally hazardous conduct after the remedy has been applied. Corporate agents thus would 
be exposed to personal liability, but only to the extent they are and continue to be 
shareholders. 
245 See supra notes 49, 68 and accompanying text. 
246 See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
247 Cf. DAGAN, supra note 195, at 298 (“[T]his preference reflects a strong intuition that 
does survive normative scrutiny, namely: the idea that involuntary creditors should not be 
  
2013] VEIL-PIERCING UNBOUND 131 
 
groups, which utilize judgment-proofing strategies on the largest scale. But 
even when presented with these favorably stacked concerns, veil-piercing 
cannot match the constructive trust. 
C. Three+ Dimensions 
The ultimate litmus test for any corporate disregard theory, though, is the 
corporate enterprise. Fragmenting a business into a network of corporate 
affiliates or siblings is an extremely effective prophylactic for veil-piercing.248 
As with parent-subsidiary structures, the “alter ego” or “instrumentality” 
inquiry can be thwarted by creating multiple corporations, each of which 
adheres to corporate formalities and conducts distinct operations.249 Moreover, 
because veil-piercing is designed to hold only a shareholder personally liable, 
the remedy affords no relief for assets transferred from a corporation through a 
parent to a third firm or party.250 
The difficulties posed by enterprises form part of veil-piercing lore. In 
Walkovszky v. Carlton,251 a pedestrian struck by a taxicab attempted to reach 
through a controlling shareholder to access his nine other separately 
incorporated taxicab companies and their insurance reserves.252 The suit was 
dismissed on the basis that its veil-piercing theory did not seek derivative relief 
from the shareholder.253 In rejecting that theory, the court observed that “it 
cannot reasonably or logically be inferred . . . that the business . . . carried on 
by a larger corporate entity composed of many corporations . . . would be 
liable to each other’s creditors in contract and in tort.”254 As a result, the 
 
pooled together with voluntary ones.”). 
248 ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW § 
3.08, at 63 (1999) (“Under existing law, the segmentation strategy, as in isolating riskier 
portions of a business in separate subsidiaries, is a viable strategy frequently utilized.”); see 
also Lynn M. LoPucki, The Essential Structure of Judgment Proofing, 51 STAN. L. REV. 
147, 149 (1998) (demonstrating how judgment-proofing can be obtained by splitting a 
business structure into multiple limited liability entities). 
249 See supra notes 228-29 and accompanying text. 
250 Cf. Berle, supra note 207, at 354 (“Whenever ‘corporate entity’ is challenged, the 
court looks at the enterprise. . . . This is, in essence, not so much a ‘disregard of the 
corporate fiction’ as it is a holding that the economic enterprise . . . is illegal, or criminal, or 
in violation of public policy, or fraudulent, or otherwise objectionable, as the case may 
be.”). 
251 223 N.E.2d 6 (N.Y. 1966). 
252 Id. at 7. 
253 Id. at 8 (“[I]t is one thing to assert that a corporation is a fragment of a larger 
corporate combine which actually conducts the business. It is quite another to claim that the 
corporation is a ‘dummy’ for its individual stockholders . . . .” (citation omitted)).  
254 Id. at 10. This precursor to enterprise liability was couched by the Walkovszky court in 
terms of agency principles. Id. at 7-8 (“In determining whether liability should be extended 
to reach assets beyond those belonging to the corporation, we are guided, as Judge Cardozo 
noted, by ‘general rules of agency.’” (quoting Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 
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plaintiff was forced to amend the complaint to seek relief against only the 
controlling shareholder in his individual capacity, whose presumably 
inadequate personal assets had prompted the initial attempt to reach the sibling 
companies.255 
These shortcomings of veil-piercing have inspired what is known as 
enterprise liability.256 More of a theory than an accepted doctrine,257 the 
strategy is to demonstrate that a failure to treat various corporate entities as a 
collective whole would promote injustice.258 As should be apparent, enterprise 
liability borrows heavily from traditional veil-piercing;259 and, not surprisingly, 
they can be confused for the same purpose.260 
Some, however, maintain that enterprise liability is worth the stretch. 
Indeed, Phillip Blumberg has advocated for the wholesale replacement of 
liability for entities with that for enterprises.261 To accomplish this, the 
 
61 (N.Y. 1926))). 
255 Walkovszky v. Carlton, 287 N.Y.S.2d 546, 547 (App. Div. 1968) (“[T]he amended 
complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action against appellant, i.e., that he and the other 
individual defendants were conducting the business of the taxicab fleet in their individual 
capacities.”), aff’d, 244 N.E.2d 55, 55 (N.Y. 1968); see also Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 
484 (speculating that the action eventually settled). 
256 Cf. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 526 (“Properly understood, veil-piercing is a vertical 
form of liability . . . . Enterprise liability provides a horizontal form of liability . . . .”). A 
related doctrine, which resides within bankruptcy, is substantive consolidation. See, e.g., In 
re Bonham, 226 B.R. 56, 77 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1998) (rejecting an analogy to veil-piercing 
as “misplaced” and instead concluding that “substantive consolidation is more like the 
corporate law notion of enterprise liability”); see also supra notes 174-176 and 
accompanying text. 
257 Cf., e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. of Ill., Inc. v. Ter Maat, 195 F.3d 953, 959-60 (7th 
Cir. 1999) (noting the “general rule . . . that a shareholder qua shareholder, and a parent, 
subsidiary, or other affiliate, qua affiliate, is not liable for a corporation’s debts,” and 
observing that the prospect of requiring enterprises “to maintain a sufficient capital cushion 
to be answerable” for externalized risk “has not carried the day in any jurisdiction that we 
are aware of”). 
258 Cf., e.g., Gartner v. Snyder, 607 F.2d 582, 587 (2d Cir. 1979) (requiring plaintiff to 
prove defendant shareholder’s use of “the larger combine, to conduct his purely personal 
business”). 
259 PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 248, § 3.08, at 63 (observing that, to impose enterprise 
liability, “it is necessary to focus on the grounds used to pierce the corporate veil”); see also 
supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
260 Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 528 (“[W]hile the remedies are conceptually distinct, in 
practice the line between them tends to blur. In many cases, much the same set of facts 
could be invoked to justify either or both remedies.”). 
261 PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROBLEMS IN THE 
BANKRUPTCY OR REORGANIZATION OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS, INCLUDING 
THE LAW OF CORPORATE GUARANTIES § 18.02, at 699-704 (1985); see also Robert B. 
Thompson, Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and Vicarious Liability of Corporate 
Participants for Torts of the Enterprise, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1, 35-40 (1994) (advocating 
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boundaries between different entities would be assessed based on the “degree 
of economic integration between the formally separate but commonly 
controlled components of the corporate group.”262 Although the natural 
question would seem to be what constitutes “economic integration,” Blumberg 
never provides an answer,263 much less indicates how this approach could yield 
principled or predictable results.264 
The reason may be that enterprise liability ultimately cannot achieve 
anything superior than its conceptual fountainhead, veil-piercing. This is 
because both schemes are designed conventionally around liability rules. 
While the justifications for limited liability clearly do not extend to 
enterprises,265 defining them is hardly a sure proposition. The diverse array of 
potential corporate groups, either in parent-subsidiary or enterprise form, 
virtually ensures a contextual, fact-intensive inquiry.266 
The benefits of enterprise liability, however, can be approximated by the 
constructive trust. The real challenge with affiliate, parent-subsidiary, or 
sibling structures is not sorting out their exact relationships, but rather 
preventing misappropriated assets from being divided among or transferred to 
multiple corporations. All too often, by the time a complex corporate structure 
can be dissected, the money already is gone. Imposition of a constructive trust, 
however, results in the application of tracing rules that operate independent of 
the form or type of corporate structure.267 This is because any ultimate holder 
can be designated a constructive trustee, provided the misappropriated assets 
can be identified;268 and even when those assets have been intermixed with 
 
enterprise liability). 
262 BLUMBERG, supra note 8, § 22.03.2, at 431. 
263 Blumberg does identify four “very rough types of complex corporate enterprises,” but 
acknowledges that they are “imprecise” and that “[i]t obviously is not possible to fit all 
industrial structures conveniently into any arbitrary system of classification.” Id. § 22.03.3, 
at 432, 437.  
264 See LoPucki, supra note 67, at 67 (criticizing Blumberg’s proposal as “vague and 
uncertain,” and likely to “produce intolerable uncertainty for other system participants as 
well”). 
265 See Phillip I. Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, 11 J. CORP. L. 573, 
630 (1986) (“If a subsidiary corporation constitutes only one of a number of components of 
a corporate group collectively conducting a fragmented unitary business, the very basis for 
the establishment of limited liability as a matter of general legal policy disappears.” 
(footnote omitted)). But see Kashfi v. Phibro-Salomon, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 727, 732-33 
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (“Courts are reluctant to disregard the separate existence of related 
corporations by piercing . . . and have consistently given substantial weight to the 
‘presumption of separateness.’”). 
266 See supra note 229 and accompanying text. 
267 See supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text. 
268 See supra note 244 and accompanying text. 
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legitimate ones, a myriad of tracing methods are available for courts to 
disgorge funds in an equitable fashion.269 
Corporate affiliates or siblings thus present no unusual challenge. When a 
judgment cannot be enforced against a particular corporate defendant, a court 
simply follows the trail of any assets linked to the underlying harm into the 
hands of any shareholder, related company, or third party.270 If these assets 
have been appropriated wrongfully, the current holder must proffer a valid 
explanation for retaining title.271 Absent any justification or defense, that 
holder is designated a constructive trustee and the assets subject to proprietary 
claims.272 The plaintiff-beneficiary then elects its preferred remedy.273 
But this analysis would not have altered the outcome in Walkovszky. 
Although that case nicely illustrates the (limited) mechanics of veil-piercing 
within the corporate-enterprise scenario, the siblings correctly were shielded 
from joint and several liability; as the court noted, the fact that all of these 
corporations had complied with the minimum statutory insurance requirements 
negated any possible finding of fraudulent or illicit conduct.274 To uphold 
limited liability, therefore, would be a justified result.275 In contrast, a 
constructive trust inquiry for Walkovszky would not have focused on whether 
the defendant corporation had inadequate capital or committed a wrong, but 
whether assets may have been “shuttling” among the different entities and 
shareholders in an unjustified manner.276 Because no such evidence was 
present,277 equity would have concluded that a constructive trust was 
unjustified. 
Nor would the outcome perforce differ if such evidence did exist. Imagine 
the same facts in Walkovszky, but with one slight wrinkle: after the plaintiff’s 
suit has been instigated, the defendant corporation distributes enough cash to 
cover all damages in the form of a preferred dividend to a minority (affiliate or 
sibling) shareholder.278 Due to a lack of requisite control or domination, 
 
269 See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
270 See supra note 244 and accompanying text. 
271 See supra notes 237-41 and accompanying text. 
272 See supra notes 189-96 and accompanying text. 
273 See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
274 Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6, 10 (N.Y. 1966) (“If it is not fraudulent for the 
owner-operator of a single cab corporation to take out only the minimum required liability 
insurance, the enterprise does not become either illicit or fraudulent merely because it 
consists of many such corporations.”). 
275 See supra notes 53-54, 207, 210, 219 and accompanying text. 
276 Walkovszky, 223 N.E.2d at 10. 
277 Id. (finding the complaint lacked sufficiently particularized allegations that the 
defendants were “shuttling their personal funds in and out of the corporations”). 
278 Walkovszky actually involved three individual stockholder defendants, Walkovszky v. 
Carlton, 262 N.Y.S.2d 334, 335-36 (App. Div. 1965), one of whom was Carlton, the 
controlling shareholder, Walkovszky, 223 N.E.2d at 9. The other two were never identified 
and presumably held only a minority interest. See Walkovszky, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 336. 
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traditional veil-piercing would not provide any relief.279 The only way to make 
this plaintiff whole would be to impose a constructive trust, on the basis that 
the dividend was wrongfully received and would be retained unjustifiably by 
the shareholder.280 Nevertheless, a court ultimately might decide not to order 
disgorgement. 
The reason would be an undesirable balance of competing interests. On the 
one hand, restoring unjustified benefits represents ex post compensation that 
would be justified under corrective-justice principles generally and economic 
analysis specifically for involuntary creditors.281 On the other hand, upholding 
limited liability reflects an ex ante bargain that shareholders would demand to 
protect their distributions and ensure their participation within capital 
markets.282 A quite plausible conclusion might be that restoring the plaintiff in 
this hypothetical case would incur a much larger expense to shareholder 
welfare across all corporations, and thus be a poor trade-off. Or a court might 
conclude otherwise. 
The point is that this calculus is impossible under orthodox analysis. When 
limited liability is worth preserving, veil-piercing cannot be an option. Even 
when limited liability is worth compromising for the benefit of certain types of 
creditors, veil-piercing cannot deliver any relief from the corporate enterprise. 
But where veil-piercing fails miserably, the constructive trust can succeed. 
This is because the constructive trust is detached from the underlying claim, 
and thus operates independent of limited liability and its rationales; as a result, 
courts do not face a fork in the road, but instead have equitable discretion to 
weigh the competing merits of pursuing ex ante goals or awarding ex post 
relief.283 Although only one final course of action will be taken, it will flow 
 
279 Cf. supra notes 228-229 and accompanying text. 
280 See supra notes 237-41 and accompanying text. Fraudulent transfer law also would be 
unable to void what is an entirely permissible distribution, provided the defendant 
corporation remained solvent along with its mandatory insurance coverage. See supra notes 
184-86 and accompanying text. Had the cash or some equivalent value instead been 
transferred to a third-party non-shareholder, fraudulent transfer law would not yield a 
materially different result than a constructive trust, because the receipt would be with notice 
of an adverse claim. See supra note 166. 
281 Cf. Ernest J. Weinrib, Correctively Unjust Enrichment, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT 31, 31-33, 52-53 (Robert Chambers et 
al. eds., 2009). 
282 See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text. 
283 See Puckett v. Richard, 418 So. 2d 838, 839 (Ala. 1982) (“In the exercise of its equity 
jurisdiction, a . . . court is entirely justified in molding a decree which adjusts the equities of 
all the parties.”); Duggan, supra note 141, at 219 (“The remedy is discretionary in the sense 
that, even if the case satisfies all three elements of the test, the court will still not necessarily 
impose the trust. The court may refuse to impose the trust on the ground that there are other 
remedies available . . . which make the declaration of the constructive trust unnecessary or 
inappropriate.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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from a more principled and predictable reasoning process that can yield 
efficient and equitable results.284 
CONCLUSION 
Veil-piercing has been called “Our Lady of the Common Law.”285 Over the 
years, though, she has been dragged through the mud and pilloried, 
withstanding attempts at expulsion from corporate law.286 All the while the 
culprit quietly has stood in our midst. We have been so enamored with the 
virtues of limited liability that using it to orient our view of veil-piercing seems 
like a natural and reasoned path. 
The problem is that “[l]imited liability is the rule, not the exception.”287 
Orthodox loss-allocation analysis frames limited and unlimited liability as 
mutually exclusive choices. Only when the rationales for limited liability have 
reached their limits is veil-piercing qua unlimited liability charged with filling 
the remaining gaps. 
The resulting doctrine is not just “rare, severe and unprincipled,”288 but 
inadequate, incomplete, and incorrect. No one seriously defends limited 
liability within mass-risk or enterprise scenarios; yet veil-piercing proper is 
unable to occupy that void. While everyone agrees that limited liability should 
not apply in tort, empirical studies uniformly find otherwise. Furthermore, 
those studies, along with courts and commentators, neglect veil-piercing claims 
grounded in property and unjust enrichment.289 Despite veil-piercing’s origins 
as a provisional procedural device forged from equity, courts continue to look 
the other way and insist that veil-piercing is a partially legal remedy that 
entails a triable right.290 
To ignore the past of veil-piercing condemns it to an ineluctable fate. The 
conclusion from our early corporate history is that unlimited shareholder 
 
284 Whether resort to the constructive trust would diminish the volume of veil-piercing 
requests is difficult to predict. One variable is how courts would conduct a remedial hearing, 
which some, but not all, courts correctly conduct for veil-piercing; the specifics of that 
procedure would affect the ultimate incentives of parties to settle. Moreover, the 
constructive trust arguably might open the door to some claims, such as enterprise liability, 
that otherwise are foreclosed under the current approach. Certainly, though, the constructive 
trust can handle what pure veil-piercing is designed to redress, and in a more principled 
fashion that would benefit not only litigants but entrepreneurs attempting to assess their 
liability risk. 
285 WORMSER, supra note 27, at 40. 
286 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
287 Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 362 (1944)  
288 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 21, at 89. 
289 See supra Part I.B. 
290 See, e.g., William Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developers S., Inc., 933 F.2d 
131, 136 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[T]he action for piercing the corporate veil appears to have its 
roots in both law and equity.”). 
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liability was the default rule applied when a corporation was judgment-
proof.291 Following the lead of English chancery courts, American legislatures 
fashioned an incidental equitable remedy. The nature, function, and scope of 
what later became veil-piercing thus were independent of limited liability. 
Nothing that has transpired since, not even the shift from democratic to 
economic rationales for limited liability, amounts to an intervening cause that 
would justify abandoning this original conceptual scheme. 
We not only have denied the past, but also cannot see a better future. Almost 
a century ago, Justice Cardozo stumbled upon the noble conscience of 
equity,292 the constructive trust, yet failed to realize its relevance for veil-
piercing. He is not alone. Although ubiquitous within non-corporate contexts, 
the constructive trust has never been considered as an alternative that maps 
onto veil-piercing and can produce superior results. Instead, corporate law 
stubbornly focuses on proposals to repackage or tweak veil-piercing as 
currently conceived.293 
Veil-piercing cannot be salvaged so simply; it must be re-conceived. Classic 
scenarios that reveal the limits of veil-piercing are handled quite capably by 
the constructive trust. Further, insolvency provides a setting where the 
constructive trust shines, presenting a choice of remedies that enables a 
plaintiff to optimize equitable relief while veil-piercing claims are pooled with 
general unsecured creditors. Indeed, when also compared against equitable 
subordination and fraudulent transfer law, the constructive trust represents the 
most satisfying means to solve the persistent challenge of how to make 
judgment-proof corporations and shareholders accountable for malfeasance. 
Lady Justice has waited long enough for her integrity to be restored. Courts 
already possess and routinely exercise the equitable discretion to impose and 
fashion constructive trusts sua sponte.294 Instead of having to conjure up 
metaphorical proof to beat the metaphorical veil of limited liability,295 
entrepreneurs and litigants deserve a predictable and principled approach to 
determining their ultimate exposure. By balancing the interests of claimants, 
corporations, shareholders, and third parties, courts finally can produce 
efficient and equitable results in one of the most dysfunctional and important 
areas of corporate law. 
 
 
291 See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
292 See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
293 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
294 See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text; see also Pfohl Bros. Landfill Site 
Steering Comm. v. Allied Waste Sys., Inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d 134, 141 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(imposing a constructive trust but denying a request for veil-piercing); Graham v. Mimms, 
444 N.E.2d 549, 556-57, 560-61 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (same). 
295 Cf. Fred S. McChesney, Contractarianism Without Contracts? Yet Another Critique 
of Eisenberg, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1332, 1336 (1990) (“[I]t takes a model to beat a model.” 
(citing GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 7 (4th ed. 1987))). 
